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Faretta and the Personal Defense:
The Role of a Represented Defendant
in Trial Tactics
Richard H. Chusedt
In Faretta v. California the Supreme Court held that criminal de-
fendants have a constitutional right to conduct their own defense.
The author focuses on its sixth amendment analysis and argues that,
in addition, Faretta impels trial courts to permit defendants to con-
trol the tactical course of their trials even when represented by coun-
sel. He also proposes a framework for implementing a right to mixed
representation.
In Faretta v. California the Supreme Court held that defendants
who knowingly and intelligently waive their right to counsel before trial
must, as a matter of constitutional right, be permitted to proceed pro
se.' Faretta raises tantalizing questions about the degree of control
that a defendant represented by counsel may exercise over his own de-
fense. This Article discusses the judicial treatment of defendants who
have attempted to influence the strategic choices of their counsel and
suggests that the Faretta decision requires both Bench and Bar to
accept significantly more intervention by active, represented defendants
than has occurred in the past.
Traditionally, neither the judiciary nor the organized Bar has
demonstrated much sympathy for represented defendants who actively
seek to participate in the presentation of their own defense. Such
t Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1965,
Brown University; J.D. 1968, University of Chicago Law School.
1. 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975). See also Comment, Fareta v. California and
the Pro Se Defense: The Constitutional Right of Self Representation, 25 AM. U.L. REV.
897 (1976); Note, The Constitutional Right of Self-Representation: Faretta and the
"Assistance of Counsel," 3 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 336 (1976).
2. Tensions arise in cases with both assigned and retained counsel. Compare
Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 724-27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920
(1958), with United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). The courts have generally treated counsel-client
problems similarly whether counsel is appointed or retained. But cf. Fitzgerald v. Es-
telle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1974) (suggesting that somewhat less strict standards
be applied for evaluating the competence of retained than appointed counsel). The
obvious exception is assignment of counsel itself, not a problem when the defendant
privately retains an attorney. The analysis in this Article, unless otherwise indicated,
applies to both assigned and retained counsel.
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"active" defendants are denied the ability to replace counsel, kept in
the dark about the right to proceed pro se, denied control over most
important aspects of their trials, and, if indigent, assigned counsel with-
out consultation.' The dramatic growth in reported cases involving
serious disagreements between attorneys and their client-defendants4
indicates the need for a thorough review of the accused's role in the
3. For the most interesting of numerous cases holding that a defendant may
not select his assigned counsel, see Bedrosian v. Mintz, 518 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1975);
Peters v. Gray, 494 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1974). Commentators have urged that indigent
defendants deserve a more decisive role both in selecting appointed counsel and in insur-
ing that they are compensated. Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His
Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1974); Note, Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitu-
tional Right to Compensated Counsel, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 433 (1967).
A detailed report of the operation of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1970), in the federal courts and, in particular, of the various district court
plans under the Act for appointing counsel may be found in SUBCOMMrITEE ON CON-
STrrUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 90TH CONGRESS, 2D
SEss., THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT IN THE FEDERAL DIs'rcr COURTS, 69-115 (Comm.
Print 1969). Regardless of the method of selection used under the Act, defendants'
choices are not given any effect in the assignment systems. See, e.g., United States
v. Davis, 365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966). The Act provides below-market-rate payment
for counsel appointed to represent defendants in the federal courts. See 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(d)(1)-(2). For a review of counsel appointment systems prior to 1965, see
L. SiLvmRsrN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 15-17 (1965); for a more modem look see
LaFrance, Criminal Defense Systems for the Poor, 50 NOTRE DAME LAw. 41 (1974).
In some places administration of the right to counsel has become primarily nonjudi-
cial. For example, in the District of Columbia Superior Courts counsel is assigned
administratively while the defendant is waiting to be arraigned. No provision is rou-
tinely made for a defendant who wishes to talk about the role of counsel with a judge
before counsel is accepted. Such a system provides less room for "active" defendants
desiring to control the tactics of their cases than do systems where counsel is assigned
in open court.
4. See, e.g., Stepp v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United
States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rosenthal, 470 F.2d
837 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1972); Lauchli v. United States, 432 F.2d
1207 (7th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970); Jackson v.
United States, 412 F.2d 149 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Jones, 369 F.2d 217
(7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Vess v. Peyton,
352 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Terranova, 309 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1962);
Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958);
Swope v. McDonald, 173 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1949); United States v. Gutterman, 147
F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1945); United States ex rel. Torry v. Rockfeller, 361 F. Supp. 422
(W.D.N.Y. 1973); Spears v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.W. Va. 1966); State
v. Gilbert, 105 Ariz. 475, 467 P.2d 63 (1970); People v. Williams, 2 Cal. 3d 894,
471 P.2d 1008, 88 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1970); People v. Hill, 70 Cal. 2d 678, 452 P.2d
329, 76 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); People v. Gay, 37 Cal. App. 2d 246, 99 P.2d 371
(2d Dist. 1940); State v. Banks, 216 Kan. 390, 532 P.2d 1058 (1975); Shelton v. State,
3 Md. App. 394, 239 A.2d 610 (1968); People v. Wilson, 43 Mich. App. 459, 204
N.W.2d 269 (1972); State v. Townes, 522 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); State v.
Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565 (1967); Walker v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 258,
199 S.E.2d 518 (1973); Green v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 727, 180 S.E.2d 531 (1971).
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presentation of his defense. 5 Although a criminal trial is typically
described as a three-party relationship between court, defense, and
prosecution 6 it is often more realistic to picture it as a four-corner
contest between court, prosecution, defense counsel, and defendant.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the historical
roots of the traditional doctrines surrounding the attorney-client rela-
tionship and concludes that the severe restriction these rules im-
pose on the ability of a represented defendant to influence trial
strategy have been inappropriately developed from habeas corpus and
right-to-counsel jurisprudence. Part II analyzes the opinion in Faretta
v. California and argues that the decision requires acceptance of partici-
pation by represented defendants in their trials. Part III describes
cases in which defendants have been permitted to present their defen-
ses both in person and with the aid of counsel and finds that such cases
provide a sound foundation for implementing Faretta. Part IV suggests
some solutions for the practical problems arising from the right of de-
fendants to proceed in person and with counsel in the same trial.
I
MERE TACTICS AND THE CONSTITUTION:
HISTORICAL ROOTS FOR THE DOMINANCE OF 'COUNSEL
The traditional doctrine that decisions on matters of trial tactics
are properly made by counsel alone finds support in three bodies of
5. In the narrow context of plea bargaining Professor Alschuler has noted:
Professor Jerome H. Skolnick has observed that, in the attorney-client
relationship, the attorney usually regards himself as the "player." The mate-
rial in this article has, of course, tended to support this conclusion. Most
defense attorneys agree that a client must finally decide for himself whether
to enter a plea of guilty, but they often adhere to this proposition in only a
narrow and technical sense. Their view is not that a client may direct his
lawyer to defend him at trial; it is merely that the client is free to seek a new
lawyer when he is dissatisfied with the choice of plea that his attorney has
advised.
Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1306-
07 (1975) (citing Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICt
RESOLtroN 52, 65 (1967)). Thus, even in areas where the client is said to control
the law suit, there is substantial doubt that the daily reality accords with theory. See
also J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE (1972).
For discussion of the lawyer-client relationship in civil cases, see D. ROSENTHAL, LAW-
YER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974).
6. E.g., ABA SrANDARDS RELATINo TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JuS-
TICE, ThE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 1.1(a) (1971) [hereinafter cited as THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION]:
Counsel for the accused is an essential component of the administration
of criminal justice. A court properly constituted to hear a criminal case must
be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the judge (and jury, where appro-
priate), counsel for the prosecution, and counsel for the accused.
7. Id. § 5.2(b) states the traditional rule:
The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-
examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made,
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precedent: habeas corpus bypass litigation, ineffective assistance of
counsel disputes, and counsel assignment cases.8 A major focal point
for the litigation of control questions arose from Fay v. Noia9 and Henry
v. Mississippi,'° in which the Supreme Court held that federal habeas
corpus petitioners who have deliberately bypassed a state procedural
remedy for the presentation of a federal constitutional claim forego
their right to seek redress in a federal forum."1 Inquiries into "deliber-
ate bypass" have often resulted in decisions permitting counsel to bind
a client in tactical decisions to waive a constitutional claim. Ineffective
assistance of counsel cases have consistently held that tactical matters
are for counsel alone to resolve. Their rationale is that appraisal of
counsel's performance would become impossible for the judiciary if
every aspect of a trial were subject to the second-guessing of an appel-
late tribunal. Similarly, defendants have been denied the ability to
control trial tactics by firing their attorneys, whether assigned or re-
tained; courts routinely prohibit voluntary withdrawal of counsel or as-
signment of new counsel when the only reason for the change is a dis-
pute over trial tactics.12 This section analyzes this triad of cases and
concludes that their extension to prohibit represented defendants from
participating in any tactical aspects of their trials is unfortunate, illogi-
cal, and, after Faretta, unconstitutional.
A. Deliberate Bypass Cases
In Fay petitioner Noia allowed the time for filing of a direct appeal
from his state conviction to lapse. He later filed a habeas petition in
and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the
lawyer after consultation with his client.
8. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54
MINN. L. REv. 1175, 1252-63 (1970); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation
as a Ground for Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. L. REV. 289 (1964);
White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional
Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. REv. 67, 69-76 (1972) [hereinafter cited as White]; Comment,
Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence and Legit-
imate State Interest, 54 CALIF. L REv. 1262 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Calif. L. Rev.]; Comment, State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80
HARv. L. REv. 422 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Harv. L. Rev.]; Comment,
Federal Habeas Corpus and the Doctrine of Waiver Through the Deliberate Bypass of
State Procedures, 31 LA. L. REV. 601 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, La. L.
Rev].
9. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
10. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
11. See White, supra note 8; Lay, Problems of Federal Habeas Corpus Involving
State Prisoners, 45 F.R.D. 45 (1969); Comment, Calif. L. Rev., supra note 8; Comment,
Harv. L. Rev., supra note 8; Comment, La. L. Rev., supra note 8.
12. United States v. Main, 443 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Grow,




federal court seeking relief because he was convicted on the basis of
a coerced confession. The Supreme Court held that the failure to ap-
peal in the state courts did not deprive the federal courts of the power
to grant relief in habeas corpus, but added that a "federal habeas judge
may in his discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts and in so doing has
forfeited his state court remedies."'18 The Court emphasized that the
deliberate bypass decision must be "'an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege' ",'4 by the defendant and
that "[a] choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner
does not automatically bar relief." 15
This cryptic statement was discussed in slightly greater detail in
Henry v. Mississippi,'6 decided only 2 years later. Henry took certio-
rari to the Supreme Court from a state conviction for disturbing the
peace. The conviction had been affirmed by the state supreme court
despite the use at trial of evidence seized in violation of the fourth
amendment, because counsel had failed to comply with the contempo-
raneous objection rule.'7  The Supreme Court implied that an adequate
state procedural ground for decision would not automatically bar a
federal court from hearing a federal constitutional claim, but that access
to a federal forum could be barred if the state procedural remedy were
deliberately bypassed.' 8 The Court remanded for a factual hearing on
the bypass question, noting that "trial strategy adopted by counsel with-
out prior consultation with an accused will not, where the circumstances
are exceptional, preclude the accused from asserting constitutional
claims."' 9 Although Henry was heard on certiorari, succeeding courts
have assumed that the case applies as well to the ability of federal courts
to review state court decisions on collateral attack.20
The exceptional circumstances phraseology of Henry has spawned
an interesting yet confusing body of case law. Some courts have con-
centrated on the Henry language and have consequently permitted
counsel to waive a client's access to a federal forum in all but excep-
13. 372 U.S. at 438.
14. Id. at 439 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
15. 372 U.S. at 439.
16. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
17. The rule required that objection to the introduction of evidence be made at
the time of its introduction. Counsel's objections were stated during argument on a
motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of the government's case in chief,
rather than at the point when the evidence was introduced. Id. at 445-46.
18. Id. at 450.
19. Id. at 451.
20. E.g., Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965). Henry's reliance
on Fay supports this use. 379 U.S. at 450.
[Vol. 65:636
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tional circumstances;2 others, looking to the Fay language requiring
participation by the accused in the waiver decision, have granted habeas
petitions when the defendant was unaware of counsel's actions.22
The Supreme Court has not satisfactorily resolved this split in
authority. The only clear exception to the ability of counsel to waive
access to a federal forum is the decision to enter a plea of guilty. 2
21. For example, in Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965), a state
prisoner alleged that unconstitutionally seized evidence had been used in his trial. His
attorney had failed to pursue state suppression remedies, apparently because he felt that
the search that produced the evidence was consensual. The court, without reaching
the merits of the search question, held that a deliberate bypass of a state procedural
remedy had occurred. Counsel's decision to forego a suppression motion, even if made
without the knowledge of the defendant or over the objections of the defendant, bound
the accused. The court, noting that a contrary ruling would "seriously impair the con-
stitutonal guaranty of the right to counsel," found that only counsel was competent
to make the decision whether to file a suppression motion. Id. at 81. The Ninth
Circuit has consistently followed Nelson. E.g., U.S. v. Palmateer, 469 F.2d 273 (9th
Cir. 1972); Poole v. Fitzharris, 396 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1968); Davis v. Dunbar, 394
F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1968). Cf. Curry v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1968) (in
a review on the merits, counsel's waiver held binding). Only when an attorney has
demonstrated apparent incompetence by not knowing of the availability of a remedy,
has the Ninth Circuit shown much willingness to permit a federal collateral attack after
counsel chose a state court strategy. See Pineda v. Craven, 424 F.2d 369 (9th Cir.
1910).
Today the fourth amendment issues raised by Nelson would be moot. The Supreme
Court's recent holding that fourth amendment questions are generally not cognizable
in federal courts if a state provides a fair opportunity to raise the issue would have
obviated the need to consider the bypass question. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037
(1976).
Although other circuits have also held that decisions by counsel may operate as
a bypass for purposes of collateral attack, they do not use the broad language of the
Ninth Circuit in bestowing control of tactics upon counsel. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Agron v. Herold, 426 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1970) (failure to act on prejudicial
pretrial publicity); Mathis v. Colorado, 425 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1970) (counsel's ex-
tensive cross-examination operates as waiver); Mize v. Crouse, 399 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 913 (1969) (failure to object to evidence).
22. In United States ex rel. Gockley v. Meyers, 378 F.2d 398 (3rd Cir.1967),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969), counsel explicitly did not object to use of a confes-
sion, apparently for sound tactical reasons. Nevertheless, the court remanded for a
hearing on the bypass issue and required some showing that the defendant participated
in the decision in order to find a deliberate bypass. See also United States ex rel.
Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500 (3rd Cir. 1969). But see United States ex rel.
LaMolinare v. Duggan, 415 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1969). Other circuits have also looked
for evidence of the defendant's participation before deciding upon a bypass. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1974) (in-court identification suppression
problem); Hale v. Boles, 419 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1969). There are also "in-between"
cases, where the courts have searched for some minimal indication that a defendant
participated in the decision under review in order to satisfy the ambiguous language
of Fay and Henry. E.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Illinois, 469 F.2d 1297 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
23. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Spears v. United States, 250 F. Supp.
698 (S.D.W. Va. 1966). To bar counsel from unilaterally pleading his client guilty
does not significantly aid the tactical control analysis. To plead guilty is a waiver
even more encompassing than the decision to dispense with counsel for trial. It is a
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Control over other areas, such as use of testimony by the defendant or
filing a notice of appeal, is unclear.24  In the most recent Supreme
Court bypass case, Estelle v. Williams,25 the habeas petitioner's due
process rights were violated when he was dressed in prison garb for
his state court trial. The Court refused, however, to grant Williams
relief because no objection was made to the use of such clothing. The
failure to protest did not warrant "a conclusion that respondent was
compelled to stand trial in jail garb or that there was sufficient reason
to excuse the failure to raise the issue before trial. '20  The Court noted
that the strict Zerbst knowing and intelligent waiver standard did not
question not of allocating power, but of completely waiving the right to exercise any
power over the trial. Leaving the defendant free to control his plea indicates little about
his ability to control counsel's pretrial and trial activities.
In Brookhart, for example, counsel, without clear consent from the accused, agreed
to proceed on a "prima facie trial." The trial contained only government testimony
and lacked any cross examination or defense case. The Court found this process the
virtual equivalent of a guilty plea and reversed the conviction for lack of a knowing
and intelligent waiver.
24. Compare United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965), with United
States v. Jones, 369 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1966) (defendant's testimony). See also Nelson
v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1969); Grimes v. United States, 396 F.2d 331 (9th
Cir. 1968).
The ABA Standards provide that pleading, waiver of a jury, and testimony by the
accused are decisions for the defendant. Tim DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 7, § 5.2
(a). "Strategic and tactical decisions" are left with counsel. Id. § 5.2(b). The com-
mentary to section 5.2 cites two cases-both involving jury waiver-for the proposition
that waiver of a jury and the right of the accused to testify must be by the accused.
Neither is apposite. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), dealt with the waiva-
bility of juries as a general matter, not with the power question; both the accused and
his counsel were fully informed of the facts underlying the waiver of a twelve person
jury. Id. at 286. Hensley v. United States, 281 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1960), suggests
a proposition different than that stated in the Standards. In Hensley the decision of
counsel to waive a jury, made without the knowledge of the defendant, was held to
bind the defendant. In the direct appeal the court found that the accused acquiesced
in counsel's decision by his silence during trial. The result implies that active participa-
tion by the defendant is not necessary in a jury waiver decision. See also Parker v.
United States, 507 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1974), which leaves open the question whether
an attorney may waive a double jeopardy defense on behalf of his client.
25. 425 U.S. 501 (1976). See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976),
in which the failure to make timely objection to the composition of a state grand jury
according to state law precluded the defendant from federal habeas relief. The state
law was given effect because there was no showing of actual prejudice. The case does
not directly discuss the attorney-client waiver problems. Justice Brennan cast bitter
dissents in both cases, mourning the apparent passing of the Fay rule that waivers must
be proved by the state, not disproved by the habeas petitioner. The burden of proof
issue, although obviously important in habeas jurisprudence, has little bearing on the
theory of control under discussion here. Regardless of who has the burden, there must
still be a resolution of the control question. The practical impact of Francis is clearly
to broaden the scope of control by counsel. At least in tactical areas counsel's failure
to object will apparently suffice to bind a client in the waiver of a federal forum. The
impact upon pro se cases is unclear.
26. 425 U.S. at 512.
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apply to mere tactical decisions, that the attorney, once appointed, con-
trolled such decisions, and that the failure to object could have been
tactically based.17  Despite the imprecision of the opinion, the Court
has left counsel free to bind his client in a waiver of the right to seek
federal review of virtually all his constitutional claims.
Commentators on the bypass issue have tried valiantly to make
sense out of the Fay-Henry abyss. In an attempt to structure the cases
various factors have been suggested to determine the allocation of
power to deliberately bypass a state remedy. Among them are the
time at which the dispute arises,28 the intelligence of the defendant, 9
and the importance of the right in dispute . 0  Regardless of the test
used to justify or explain the control allocation, all assume that split
control is appropriate and that permanently defining the boundaries of
power is necessary.
Neither the case law nor the literature is helpful in analyzing the
problem of who should control tactical decisions. For example, the
problem of time pressures during trial need not be resolved by allocat-
ing control to the attorney. Many decisions may be made just as
quickly by a defendant as by counsel.31 Contending that some deci-
sions must be made quickly does not by itself provide any guidance for
allocating the power to make the decision.
Similarly, intelligence of the defendant is not as relevant a basis
for allocating power at trial as for deciding a case on collateral attack.
A verdict rendered in a state court assumes a status of "rationality" not
yet bestowed upon a future trial. The federal judiciary's reluctance to
interfere with a state court judgment compels the federal assumption
that counsel behaved reasonably at the state trial. As long as some
27. id. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred, similarly noting that
counsel may not deliberately forego an objection because it is likely to be futile, and
expect later to obtain habeas relief. Id. at 515 (Powell, J., concurring). In a footnote
the Justices noted that this case involved a "trial-type right" and therefore counsel could
bind his client. Id. at 515 n.4 (citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), and
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966)). See also Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41
(1972).
28. Comment, Calif. L. Rev., supra note 8, at 1269-72. The Comment suggests
that participation of the defendant is more feasible before the trial, since time pressures
will prevent dialogue during trial.
29. White, supra note 8, at 68; Comment, Harv. L. Rev., supra note 8, at 435.
30. White, supra note 8, at 68; Comment, Calif. L. Rev., supra note 8, at 1267-
69; Comment, Harv. L Rev., supra note 8, at 435.
31. This is not to say such decisions will be made more wisely by a defendant
than by counsel. Similarly, trial efficiency may be just as easily maintained without
regard to the power allocation decision so long as it is clear that as to any particular
decision, basic power rests with one party or another. The literature suggests that such
allocation must basically be the same for all cases. It is my contention that such rigidity
is both unnecessary and unconstitutional.
1977]
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intelligent person, be it defendant or counsel, made the tactical waiver
decision, finality arguably should attach to the verdict. Thus, unintelli-
gent defendants may be bound by the decisions of competent counsel.
While trial preparation is progressing, however, any "active" defendant
may justifiably contend that the problems of state-federal relationships
should take a back seat to the conduct of his trial.
The importance of a right may also be a more rational basis for
deciding a habeas problem than for resolving control over a trial tactic.
The federal system has historically been reluctant to reverse a state court
unless the trial deviated substantially from federal constitutional norms.
Minor deviations from established principals are often overlooked in
collateral attack cases. In addition, many tactical decisions are made
on issues in which, at least before Faretta, no constitutional rights were
at issue. Even the most mundane of tactical disputes, however, may
trigger serious disagreements between client and counsel.
Finally, although a decision already made might justifiably be cast
in stone to prevent reversal on collateral attack, such finality arguments
do not help make the original power allocation. The judicial focus
must change from finality concerns to the desirability of coercing a de-
fendant into accepting a particular form of defense; and from waiver
of a federal forum to waiver of the assistance of counsel for part or
all of the trial. Thus, traditional habeas jurisprudence provides little
insight for a trial judge attempting to resolve such a dispute.8 2
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Mere Tactics
Attempts have been made to use allegations of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel to provide both the extraordinary circumstances
necessary for federal collateral review and a means for discussion of
the allocation of control over a trial.3 8 Although such allegations have
provided a basis for federal review of state decisions,3 4 they have not
opened the door for challenges to counsel's control of pretrial and trial
strategy. Contentions that certain decisions were made in disregard of
the defendant's wishes are summarily dismissed as frivolous. "Mere
tactical decisions" made by counsel without regard to the defendant's
32. The above analysis is for purposes of argument only. Faretta itself compels
significant rethinking of the Fay-Henry line of cases. See Section IV(E) infra.
33. For a discussion of the relation between habeas corpus and effective assistance
of counsel, see Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: De-
partures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927 (1973); Waltz, supra note 8; Section
IV(C) infra.
34. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Fitzgerald v. Estelle,
505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975); Nelson v. Peyton, 415
F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1007 (1970).
[Vol. 65:636
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wishes have not provided a basis for relief under the sixth amend-
ment3 5
The reasoning of these cases, so far as it goes, is correct. The
ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine was created to control the
quality of counsel, not the ability of counsel to persuade an "active"
defendant to proceed in his best interests. It would turn traditional ef-
fective assistance law on its head to say that counsel must assist his
client in the presentation of a strategically foolish defense.
The use of effective assistance of counsel cases to deny defendants
any ability to control the actions of their counsel is, however, unwar-
ranted. Although it is understandable that appellate courts fear de-
tailed review of the wisdom of counsel's tactical decisions, a defendant
desiring to control his counsel's activity is explicitly rejecting the right
to effective counsel for part of his trial. The issue thus is not the
efficacy of precise appellate quality control, but the standards to be ap-
plied in deciding whether to permit a defendant's waiver of effective
assistance.
C. Counsel Assignment and Mere Tactics
Defendants often attempt to obtain new counsel; they rarely
succeed. Courts have kept tight reins upon the assignment of counsel
to indigent defendants and the withdrawal of any attorney-assigned
or privately retained-from ongoing litigation. For example, in Brown
v. Craven36 the defendant and his appointed public defender squabbled
almost immediately after counsel's appointment. The trial court ig-
nored four pretrial requests for new counsel. Eventually, the defend-
ant refused to cooperate in any way with his appointed counsel. Even
35. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 218, 234-36 (1976). The results in the collateral
attack cases, Moran v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220 (1st Cir. 1974); Winters v. Cook, 489
F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973); Vess v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965); Tompa v.
Virginia, 331 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1964), are the same as in the direct appeal cases,
United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Hager,
505 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1974). But see Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th
Cir. 1974).
Only the control problem is at issue here. Certainly, ineffective assistance could
arise when an attorney makes a decision contrary to his client's wishes, regardless of
the control dogma. In such situations the courts are careful to state that mere trial
tactics, absent an abysmal performance, are for counsel to control. E.g., McQueen v.
Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974).
For a general review of the ineffectiveness rules and their present state of flux,
see Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 COpNELL L. RnV. 1077 (1973); Note,
Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARv. L. Rv. 1434
(1965). The harmless error rules may also provide a convenient means of ignoring
tactical difficulties. See Bridgeman v. United States, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
36. 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970).
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the attorney suggested that he be replaced before the opening of the
trial.37  The request was denied without inquiry. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial because of the
failure of the trial court to make any inquiry into the pretrial indica-
tions of attorney-client difficulties. Brown is a good example of the
oft-stated rule: "In order to warrant a substitution of counsel during
trial, the defendant must show good cause, such as conflict of interest,
a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict
which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." '  The defendant, who
had made timely requests for a new attorney and who had been tried
while totally refusing to communicate with counsel, was not to be penal-
ized by presuming that the breakdown was intentionally fomented to
disrupt the judicial process.3 9 The trial judge's general discretion with
37. Regardless of any positions taken here about the proper role of counsel after
Faretta, an attorney should promptly notify the trial court when serious difficulties arise
with a client.
In Brown the facts supporting the motion had been evident for some time. To
wait until just before trial to move for withdrawal is highly questionable behavior.
Faretta implies the need for more. careful judicial scrutiny of the attorney-client relation-
ship. A concomitant increase in the care with which counsel relates to the court should
also be required. See Section IV(B) infra.
38. United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 926 (1973). See also United States v. Woods, 487 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Grow, 394
F.2d 182 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); Swope v. McDonald, 173 F.2d
852 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 960 (1949). Even total breakdowns, however,
have not always led courts to permit counsel to withdraw. In United States v. Munn,
507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1974), a difficult client had
been through four attorneys, disagreeing with all of them and assaulting three of them.
On the morning of trial the last attorney asked to withdraw because of disagreement
with his client. He was also one of the assault victims. The withdrawal request was
.denied and the conviction was affirmed.
There are also cases where courts misapply Brown's total breakdown test. For
example, in Walker v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 258, 199 S.E.2d 518 (1973), a defendant
asked for new counsel before trial because of incompatibility, stood mute at trial, and
forbade his counsel to participate in the trial. One might question the willingness of
counsel to stand mute, without even asking to withdraw. The conviction was affirmed,
the court holding that defendant by his behavior waived his right to effective counsel.
A conflict of interest may also provide a basis for withdrawal of counsel, espe-
cially in cases where counsel represents co-defendants. Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942). When fully informed of the conflict, a defendant may elect to proceed
with the attorney anyway. United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.
1975); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 27,2 (5th Cir. 1975). In such cases the de-
fendant waives his sixth amendment right to conflict-free counsel.
39. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975); cf. United States
v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding statutory right to proceed
pro se).
The problem of intentional disruption was not discussed in Brown v. Craven,
428 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970). A trial judge, however, should be free to refuse reas-
signment of counsel if the defendant's actions were not in good faith. See United States
v. Munn, 507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1974), discussed at
note 38 supra.
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regard to assignment of both original and replacement counsel was left
largely unimpaired. Neither the sixth amendment right to counsel nor
the due process clause was construed to restrict substantially the trial
court's discretion to control the assignment or replacement of counsel. 40
The manner in which the Brown court framed the issues is impor-
tant. The trial court's primary duty was not to satisfy the desires of
the represented defendant, but to endeavor to settle the squabble as
soon as possible after becoming aware of the problem.4' Since counsel
was to be replaced only if a complete breakdown in the attorney-client
relation had occurred, the defendant was unable to exercise significant
control over counsel's behavior.
The restrictive attitude toward replacement of counsel has largely
arisen out of fear that random changes in counsel will disrupt trial
calendars. A trial judge must have significant discretion to settle trial
disputes between counsel and client in order to avoid delay of a trial.42
Many courts, however, have denied requests for new counsel arising
out of disputes over tactics, not on efficiency grounds, but because
40. Nor have the federal courts of appeals taken any steps to exercise their super-
visory authority to avoid forcing defendants to accept unwanted counsel. There are
holdings indicating that counsel, once retained or assigned, may not be changed over
the objections of a defendant. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972);
Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1961); McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d
18 (Alas. 1974). Cf. Walters v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(substitution of alternative counsel for jury selection only approved). The appellate
courts have not forced trial judges, however, to assign counsel initially selected by a
defendant.
Peters v. Gray, 494 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1974), vividly displays the depth of federal
court antagonism to constitutional claims of an accused's right to exercise control over
the assignment of counsel. An attorney, appointed to represent two codefendants,
moved to withdraw from one of the cases very shortly after appointment because of
a possible conflict of interest. Counsel, noting that one defendant had expressed dis-
satisfaction with him, asked to withdraw from the unhappy defendant's case. The trial
court granted the motion to withdraw on conflict of interest grounds, but only from
the case where the defendant had not expressed dissatisfaction. This perverse result
was rationalized on the ground that since the protesting defendant had been assigned
the attorney first, he was required to keep him. On habeas the Seventh Circuit assumed
that the judge's behavior was arbitrary, but found no constitutional violation since the
defendant in fact received effective assistance.
41. Other cases indicate that the trial court has a duty to inquire into the causes
of disputes that erupt after trial begins. See United States v. Woods, 487 F.2d 1218
(Sth Cir. 1973); United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973); Brown v.
United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Dilworth, 524 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. .1975); United
States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. United States, 412 F.2d
149 (D.C. Cir. 1969). There is general agreement that new counsel need not be ap-
pointed on the eve of or during trial. Nor must a court grant a continuance so that
counsel retained on the eve of trial may prepare. United States v. Main, 443 F.2d
900 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. '1963); State v. Banks, 216 Kan. 390, 532
P.2d 1058 (1975); State v. Slobodian, 120 N.J. Super. 68, 293 A.2d 399 (1972).
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counsel, once appointed, will presumably perform competently43 and
because defendants have no right to control trial tactics. 4  In such
cases, absent ineffective performance, a conflict of interest, or a break-
down in the attorney-client relation, the defendant is compelled to
accept the tactical decisions of his counsel.
Ironically, these traditional rules create incentives for "active" de-
fendants either to decline counsel4 5 and proceed pro se or to squabble
with counsel in the hope of obtaining a more sympathetic attorney. 40
It is apparent that these rules have been developed without considering
the interrelationship of the sixth amendment rights to proceed either
with or without counsel. 47  The efficiency needs of the judiciary simply
do not support the wholesale refusal of the courts to permit defendants
to change counsel.
43. For example, in United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1973), the
defendant charged that his counsel had revealed confidential defense matters to the
prosecution. The trial court failed to make an inquiry into the matter. Although find-
ing that such an inquiry probably should have been made, the conviction was affirmed
because counsel had handled the trial competently, and communication between counsel
and client had remained open.
44. See Vess v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
953 (1966); United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1945). In cases where
a defendant desiring to control trial strategy is told he may do so only if he proceeds
pro se, the courts usually find a waiver of counsel when the defendant elects to represent
himself. E.g., United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 984-85 (2d Cir. 1972). The
implication that changes of counsel may not occur because counsel controls trial strategy
was made explicit. Id. at 986-87. See also THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 6,
§ 5.2. See generally ABA , CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-7 [hereinafter
cited as ABA CODE].
45. Before Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), was decided, it was gener-
ally agreed that defendants had the right, whether constitutional or statutory, to proceed
pro se. United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dough-
erty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); U.S. ex rel. Maldanado v. Denno, 348 F.2d
12 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). For the
federal statutory foundation see 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970). See also Comment, Self-
Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF.
L. REv. 1479 (1971); Note, The Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel,
49 MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1965).
46. Given the disfavor with which courts generally view pro se trials, it is sur-
prising that the cases reveal no sensitivity to the pro se impulses created by the counsel
assignment and replacement systems presently in use. See United States ex rel. Soto
v. United States, 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. White, 429 F.2d 711
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 911 (1959); State v. Smith, 215 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1974). But see United
States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). That courts hide the right to proceed
pro se from unknowing defendants squabbling with counsel is unjustified under these
circumstances.
47. The rules restricting the ability of a defendant to select assigned counsel have
also ripened without reference to the right to proceed pro se. It is certainly arguable
that if a defendant may proceed pro se, he may also proceed with counsel of choice.
See authorities cited at note 3 supra.
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In summary, the pre-Faretta case law on division of control
between counsel and client reaches beyond its rational boundaries
when used to limit the ability of defendants to control the tactics of their
trials. The courts should feel free to chart a new course, unemcum-
bered by either the strictures of the bypass rules or the limited applica-
tion of the effective counsel doctrine. New rules of practice should
be developed with conscious attention to the right of a defendant to
proceed pro se. The logical starting point for their development is
Faretta v. California.
II
Faretta v. California: THE PERSONAL DEFENSE
AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
A. The Opinion
In Faretta the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment
guarantees defendants the right to proceed without counsel. 48 The
Court admitted that its decision appeared to conflict with the language
of many right-to-counsel opinions guaranteeing access to legal assist-
ance in order to provide a fair trial.49 Chief Justice Burger's dissent
concentrated on this apparent inconsistency:
[The] goal [of a fair trial] is ill-served and the integrity of and public
confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction
is obtained due to the defendant's ill-advised decision to waive coun-
sel. The damage thus inflicted is not mitigated by the lame explana-
tion that the defendant simply availed himself of the "freedom" "to
go to jail under his own banner . . ." [citation omitted]. The system
of criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-
destruction."0
The sole measure of a just system, however, is not how well a court,
or society at large, feels a case has been tried. The Faretta majority
correctly concluded that a defendant's perception of the fairness of his
trial is also important. 1 Forcing a defendant to accept counsel "can
only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him. ' 52 Faretta
48. 422 U.S. at 819-20.
49. Id. at 832-33.
50. Id. at 839-40. But in Gilmore v. Utah, 97 S. Ct. 436 (1976), the Chief
Justice, writing for the Court, permitted a personal waiver of an appeal in a death
penalty case, notwithstanding defense counsel's desire to raise serious constitutional
challenges to Utah's death penalty statute. The Chief Justice failed to note that his
decision simply affirmed the right of Gilmore to proceed pro se on appeal-a stark
contrast to his dissent in Faretta.
51. 422 U.S. at 833-34.
52. Id. at 834,
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resolves the tension between the generalized concepts of fairness dis-
cussed by Chief Justice Burger and the defendant's freedom of choice
by holding that the sixth amendment affords the defendant a personal
right to make his own defense. 3
The Court found no reason for denying Faretta the right to
represent himself. Speaking for the Court, Justice Stewart explicitly
rejected the presumed superiority of counsel as a basis for limiting pro
se representation:
It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants
could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own un-
skilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept
representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer's train-
ing and experience can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly ...
Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the
defendant might in fact present his case more effectively by conduct-
ing his own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of
averages. 54
Nor was the Court persuaded that administrative difficulties would
be significant enough to deny defendants the right to represent them-
selves. The Court countered the possibility that defendants might dis-
rupt courtroom procedures and decorum by noting that far less severe
measures were available to meet deliberate misconduct. 5 Though the
Chief Justice raised the spectre that pro se cases will impose greater
burdens on the judicial system,56 the majority did not even directly
mention the issue, thus implying that such administrative difficulties are
not enough to justify denying constitutional rights.
The Court relied heavily on the plain meaning of the sixth amend-
ment:
It is the accused, not counsel, who must be "informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation," who must be "confronted with the wit-
nesses against him," and who must be accorded "compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor." Although not stated in the
53. Id. at 819-20. Although the sixth amendment resolution is clear, the due
process clause may still dominate some cases. See Sections IV(C)-(D) infra. It is
also possible that some rights, such as the right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishments, may not be waived by anyone. See Gilmore v. Utah, 97 S. Ct. 436, 439-40
(1976) (White, J., dissenting).
54. 422 U.S. at 834. It is equally clear that pro se defendants may not rely
upon their own lack of expertise to challenge convictions under the sixth amendment.
Id. at 834 n.46. It is interesting to note that in Faretta a federal court was reviewing
a state conviction. Apparently, the Supreme Court was not convinced that the pro
se defendant's intelligence was more relevant than usual simply because the case in-
volved federal-state relations.
55. Id. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
56. 422 U.S. at 845 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation-to
make one's own defense personally-is thus necessarily implied by
the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given directly
to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense
fails.57
This literal reading, together with the actual Faretta holding, strongly
suggests that the sixth amendment provides a represented defendant
the right personally to control his defense. 58
B. Faretta and Partial Waiver
Interpreting Faretta to mean that represented defendants have a
constitutional right to control trial tactics59 is a necessary construction of
the sixth amendment. The traditional division of control between coun-
sel and client has led to cases in which defendants have proceeded pro se
when confronted with a "choice" between a specific appointed counsel
and a pro se defense or between total trial control by counsel and a pro
se trial."0 In such cases the courts have transformed the inability to
control or to change counsel into a waiver of counsel-a waiver that is
neither voluntary nor intelligent." Reconciliation of the sixth amend-
ment guarantees of counsel and personal representation requires recog-
nition of the right partially to waive either guarantee." The traditional
doctrines penalize the exercise of either sixth amendment right by auto-
57. Id. at 819-20.
58. The post-Faretta cases have not noted the implications of the opinion. See
United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lang, 527
F.2d 1264 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940 (19%/6); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Stiner v. State, 539 P.2d 750 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
59. Although the Court approved decisions indicating that counsel controls tactical
decisions, it carefully noted that
[this allocation [of power to counsel] can only be justified, however, by the
defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his representative. An
unwanted counsel "represents" the defendant only through a tenuous and
unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such repre-
sentation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Con-
stitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense.
422 U.S. at 820-21 (emphasis in original).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976); Stepp v.
Estelle, 524 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. King v. Schubin, 522 F.2d
527 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 990 (1975); United States v. Corrigan, 401 F.
Supp. 795 (D. Wyo. 1975); United States ex rel. Torry v. Rockefeller, 361 F. Supp.
422 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); Junior v. Nevada, 91 Nev. 439, 537 P.2d 1204 (1975); Green
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 727, 180 S.E.2d 531 (1971); People v. Williams, 2 Cal.
3d 894, 471 P.2d 1008, 88 Cal. Rptr. 208 (190). But see Dearinger v. United States,
344 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1965).
61. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
62. Similarly, Faretta may compel recognition of the right to choose assigned
counsel. If all counsel are presumed competent, as well as superior in ability to defend-
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matically making the other unavailable. Such a severe penalty ought
not be countenanced.63 Furthermore, neither the generally superior
ability of counsel nor the concern for judicial efficiency compels the
traditional all-or-nothing rules.
Trial efficiency concerns have been overstated. Certainly, trial
judges must have substantial discretion to control courtroom behavior
and to prevent manipulation of procedures by any party. Similarly, it
is proper that trial court control over continuances is generally left un-
disturbed by the appellate courts.64 Efficiency, however, does not ex-
plain the judicial hostility to defendant participation in tactical deci-
sions.65 Even relatively innocuous requests by defendants to partici-
pate in selecting witnesses,66 make opening or closing statements, 7 ex-
amine or cross-examine a specific witness, 6 argue a particular point of
law to the court,69 or aid in selecting the jury"0 have been routinely
denied. 71 The routine denial of such narrow requests belies the notion
ants, then arguably a defendant should be allowed to choose from among various trial
methods and attorneys in molding his defense. Although a defendant who has no par-
ticular concern over the persona of his counsel may be tried with any attorney at the
helm, only perversity could justify completely denying other defendants the right to
exercise their selectivity. See Tague, supra note 3, at 80-84, 87-99; LaFrance, supra
note 3, at 70-72.
63. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (excessive penalty attached
to exercise of right to jury trial).
64. See generally Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Crimi-
nal Courts, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 259, 267-73 (1968).
65. One certainly may quarrel, however, with the extent of power bestowed upon
trial judges. See, e.g., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
66. United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 961 (1976); Lauchli v. United States, 432 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1970); Vess
v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 953 (1966); State
v. Banks, 216 Kan. 390, 532 P.2d 1058 (1975); Shelton v. State, 3 Md. App. 394,
239 A.2d 610 (1968).
67. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.),
aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Mosby v. State, 249 Ark. 17, 457 S.W.2d 836 (1970);
Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970); Thompson v. State, 194 So. 2d
649 (Fla. 1967); Conway v. State, 15 Md. App. 198, 289 A.2d 862 (1972), cert. denied,
413 U.S. 920 (1973); State v. Velanti, 331 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. 1960); People v. Richard-
son, 4 N.Y.2d 224, 149 N.E.2d 875, 173 N.Y.S.2d 587, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 943
(1958); State v. Carr, 13 Wash. App. 704, 5-37 P.2d 844 (1975).
68. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
940 (1963); State v. Kelly, 210 Kan. 192, 499 P.2d 1040 (1972); Strosnider v. Warden,
245 Md. 692, 226 A.2d 545(1967).
69. State v. McKee, 223 N.W.2d 204 (Iowa 1974).
70. State v. Townes, 522 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1974); Heard v. State, 126 Ga. App.
62, 189 S.E.2d 895 (1972).
71. Nor do judicial efficiency concerns explain denying an indigent the right to
select his appointed counsel. See note 4 supra. With respect to monied defendants,
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that judicial efficiency alone requires the present rules. Permitting a
defendant to make a closing statement need not be disruptive or ineffi-
cient. 72  Nor is letting a defendant decide which witnesses to call
invariably wasteful of the court's time.
It is true that pro se cases may be more difficult for trial judges
to handle than normal trials). 3  A conscientious judge may spend a sig-
nificant amount of time leading a pro se litigant by the hand,74 even
though appellate courts generally refuse to require such hand holding.75
Some requests by represented defendants to participate in their trial
may raise legitimate problems of efficiency. But because defendant
participation in tactical decisions may create difficulties in some situa-
tions does not mean either that all such participation should be
prohibited or that procedures to control the new attorney-client rela-
tionship are impossible to develop. An agreement drawn before trial
between attorney and client, under the instructions or supervision of
the trial court, can prevent midtrial difficulties and reduce inefficiency
to or below the level normally associated with pro se trials.76
Finally, important efficiency reasons support permitting repre-
sented defendants to participate in their own defense. Personal par-
ticipation in the process is likely to reduce the number of attorney-
delay in selecting counsel (United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Jones, 369 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1966); Tague, supra note 4, at 96-
97) or numerous changes in counsel (United States v. Munn, 507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1974)) may lead to imposition of judicial controls, but
the basic notion of free choice of privately retained counsel has remained undisturbed
since time immemorial. W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERIcAN COURTS
14-26 (1955) [hereinafter cited as BEANEY].
72. There is the possibility that a defendant may attempt to make a closing state-
ment in order to "testify" without being subject to cross examination or to the penalties
of perjury. See State v. Whitlow, 13 Or. App. 607, 510 P.2d 1354 (1973). However,
the possibility that a defendant may try to abuse the right to make a closing statement
also exists in pro se cases. This abuse arises only when courts and prosecutors permit
a defendant to "testify" rather than make a closing argument on the evidence adduced.
Thus, a less onerous solution might be to require prosecutors simply to object to testi-
monial statements.
73. The trial judge may be obligated to intervene more forcefully in pro se trials
than in normal cases. See Section IV(C) infra. In addition, a typical pro se defendant
does not know very much law, and many judges will spend time helping such defendants.
The difficulties confronting pro se litigants are often substantial. See Robbins & Her-
man, Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or For Worse, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 629
(1976).
74. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932), a seminal right-to-counsel
case, the Government used the practice of judicial hand-holding in pro se cases as a
reason for not requiring counsel. Why courts or the various state and federal prosecu-
tors should be less willing (if they are) to hold hands now than before is explainable
only by the historical fact that the institutions providing defense counsel have become
so ubiquitous.
75. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
76. See Section IV infra.
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client disputes generated by defendants who feel powerless to control
their fate.77 Similarly, defendants using the courtroom as a podium will
find their judicial forum less a provocative stone wall and more a
cooperative participant. 78 Although it is ironic that the Burger Court
has rendered a decision whose logical extension approves the right of
"political" defendants7" to form a partnership with their "radical"
lawyers8 ° for the trial of an important case, 8 many of the chaotic trials
77. See, e.g., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970).
"Political" trials also generate feelings of helplessness. For example, in United States
v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972), the court held that the Chicago Seven trial
court's refusal to inquire into the defendant's constant indications of dissatisfaction with
counsel of record was error. 461 F.2d at 359. Bobby Seale had consistently contended
that he was represented by Charles Garry, despite the presence of appearances filed
in his case by William Kunstler and other attorneys. The trial judge's failure to inquire
into Scale's desires in the matter was held to be error. In effect, the holding required
inquiry as to whether Seale was in fact represented only by Garry.
78. The most notorious "political" case of recent history, the chaotic trial of the
Chicago Seven, provides an interesting commentary on Faretta. Out of the series of
appellate opinions resulting from that trial, United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Scale, 461 F.2d
345 (7th Cir. 1972); and In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), at least two
issues relevant to the tactical control problem surfaced. First, the Chicago defendants
specifically requested to make personal closing statements to the jury. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit quickly disposed of the issue, stating simply that the decision to deny
the Chicago defendants permission to close was properly made within the trial judge's
discretion. 472 F.2d at 407-08. That result is certainly well within the mainstream
of precedent denying represented defendants the right to participate in their trial. Con-
sistent with this holding, the Seventh Circuit, in establishing standards for trial of the
numerous contempt citations arising out of the trial, noted that the trial attorneys had
no legal obligation to control the behavior of their clients, 461 F.2d at 399, and that
defendants represented by counsel are "not to be afforded the same latitude of speech
and action as an attorney." Id. at 401.
79. It is doubtful that "political" will ever be satisfactorily defined. See Scheflin,
Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168, 191-92 (1972);
authorities cited at note 80 infra.
80. See J. SINK, POLITCAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: How To DEFEND THEM (1974);
A. GINGER, THE RELEVANT LA WYERS (1972); T. BECKER, POLTcAL TRIALS (1971).
81. Charles Garry, an attorney who has often defended "political" defendants,
has noted the close relationship he tries to attain with his clients. In describing his
work with Huey Newton, he said:
The first thing you do when you have a client in a serious case, or even a
minor case, is to get to know something about him. It's fundamental-if you
don't know your client, you're not going to be able to represent him. You
got to know what makes that client of yours tick, what makes him be like
Ile is, what direction he comes from, and what direction he's going. If you
don't then you are failing in your basic responsibility as a trial counsel-
your responsibility to marshall the facts.
GINGER, supra note 80, at 69. John George, a sole practitioner in Oakland, Cal., states
a different feeling about his clients:
At a time like this, a routine client is not looking for participatory
democracy.
You say to him, "What are we going to do with this case?"
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of the Vietnam War era could have been more placidly tried if the full
import of Faretta had been understood.82
Nor does the generally superior ability of counsel justify prohibit-
ing represented defendants from acting as co-counsel.8 3 The general
rule is that control of trial decisions rests with counsel in all areas ex-
cept the guilty plea and perhaps some other "fundamental" decisions.8 4
Yet if a defendant is the repository of wisdom in such crucial areas as
pleas, why deny the defendant authority in areas deemed merely tacti-
cal?85 If the courts are serious about relying upon counsel's tactical
superiority, they should require counsel to decide about pleas, confron-
tation, defense testimony, juries, and representation. The only pos-
sible explanation for this odd state of affairs is that courts find some
areas in which a defendant's desires, even if irrational, are so important
that they supersede the benefits of counsel.
The most compelling reason to reject counsel's expertise as a ration-
ale for the traditional rules lies in Faretta's refusal to rely on the
minimal legal abilities of most pro se defendants as a basis for limiting
the sixth amendment right to proceed without counsel. When a de-
fendant elects to proceed both with and without counsel, the compe-
tence-of-counsel argument has even less weight than it has in total pro
se cases. The defendant is not left unassisted to face a well-armed
prosecutor, but has a ready supply of advice at his disposal.8 6 The
He says, "Well, I came to you for that."
He wants you to make an arbitrary decision that you can save him, not
to explore the doubts of his case.
He says, "I know I got a weak case, that's why I come to you."
Id. at 374. The differences in attitude reflect one of the more difficult problems with
the impact of Faretta. See Section IV(B) infra.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Five
of seven defendants charged with vandalizing a Dow Chemical Company office during
the Vietnam War moved before the trial to represent themselves. The trial judge denied
the motions but granted the defendants the right personally to make opening statements
and to testify in narrative fashion. On appeal, the denial of the pro se motions was
held to be error. The participation granted the defendants by the court was not deemed
to be a sufficiently close analog to total pro se representation to avoid reversal of
the convictions.
83. Nor is it consistent to deny defendants their choice of appointed counsel be-
cause of the possibility that bad choices will be made. If a defendant may elect to
proceed without counsel, it is inconsistent to deny him the right to select counsel. The
courts should be delighted when a defendant agrees to the participation of any attorney.
84. There is considerable confusion in this area. See note 24 supra and accom-
panying text.
85. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in Faretta, suggested that some defend-
ants might perform more competently than counsel. 422 U.S. at 834.
86. Even if the performance of counsel is likely to be superior, vigorous supervi-
sion by clients of the out-of-court activities of counsel may be very beneficial. One
study indicates, for example, that personal injury plaintiffs who most closely supervise
the performance of their lawyers obtain better court results than passive clients. RosEN-
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crucial inquiry is not the propriety of permitting defendants to proceed
as co-counsel, but the legal structure to surround the implementation
of Faretta.
III
MIXED REPRESENTATION: JOINT ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRESENTATION OF THE DEFENSE
Generally, the judiciary has been unwilling to accommodate the
defendant desiring mixed representation at trial.8  Although courts
have made it clear that they do not feel compelled by the Constitution
to provide "mixed representation" upon request,8 a variety of special
circumstances has produced cases where defendants have acted as co-
counsel with their attorneys. A few judges have taken seriously the
notion that they have the discretion to grant requests by defendants de-
siring to shape the presentation of their defense.8 9 Some attorneys,
without judicial sanction, have agreed to the tactical desires of their
clients. 0 In addition, some courts endorse the practice of providing
pro se defendants with advisory counsel.' At times, these trials have
THAL, supra note 5, at 29-61. Wholesale transfer of this study's results to the criminal
forum is not possible, of course. Nevertheless, the inviting hypothesis remains that
criminal defendants who actively supervise their attorneys' out-of-court case preparation
will do better in court than other defendants. This hypothesis, if true, would lend sup-
port to the contention that defendant participation in the tactical underpinning of the
defense presentation is a wise course.
87. "Mixed representation" will be used to describe cases in which counsel and
client participate jointly in the presentation of the defense.
88. The post-Faretta case law continues to hold that mixed representation is not
constitutionally compelled. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lang, 527
F.2d 1264(4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d 82 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1974).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Terranova, 309 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1962) (counsel
followed client's instructions to remain mute, presenting no defense and cross-examining
no witnesses; ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal denied). See also United
States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961
(1976); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920
(1958).
91. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975); United States v. Price,
474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir.
1972); United States v. Spencer, 439 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1971); United States V.
Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970); Maguire v. United
States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969); United States
v. Stockheimer, 385 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 331 (7th
Cir. 1976). But see Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953); Lopez
v. Pritchess, 265 F. Supp. 136 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
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produced interesting interplay between the defendant, the advisory at-
torney, and the court. Mixed representation has been obtained-albeit
indirectly-as a matter of right in multidefendant trials in which the
defendants have taken advantage of their numbers by agreeing that
some would accept counsel and others would proceed pro se.92 Many
of these cases demonstrate that what has been done once can be re-
peated. The experience provides guidance for the implementation of
mixed representation.
A. Defendant Requests for Mixed Representation
The most difficult mixed representation situations arise when a
defendant insists, contrary to the desires of the court or counsel, that
his trial proceed in a certain fashion.93 These cases place the defend-
ant, the defense counsel, and the court in extraordinary situations.94
According to traditional rules the trial court has an obligation to inquire
into the nature of any attorney-client disagreement 5 and to attempt to
resolve the dispute; the court has virtually no obligation to replace or
tame counsel."6 Courts have responded to such crises by urging every-
92. See, e.g., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). In United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 602-71 (D.N.J.
May 18, 1973), numerous defendants were tried for breaking into the Selective Service
offices in Camden, N.J., and destroying records; some defendants had counsel and others
did not. The results were intriguing. See notes 120-22 infra and accompanying text.
93. Many of these cases arise after requests were made by counsel to withdraw
or by defendants to obtain new counsel. The affinity of the issues of choice of counsel
and control over trial strategy is remarkable. See, e.g., United States v. Bridgeman,
523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976), discussed at notes
100-06 infra and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958). The defend-
ant, Duke, an attorney, asked to proceed pro se for preliminary motions but with counsel
for trial. The court agreed. At a pretrial conference Duke told the court he wanted
Fitzgerald (his counsel) "as an associate." After some discussion the court and Duke
agreed that Fitzgerald would be "counsel," but that Duke would be allowed to examine
witnesses and argue objections or motions. A request at trial by Duke to make an
opening statement was denied. A request to proceed completely pro se was also denied.
The Ninth Circuit, in an opinion evincing exasperation with the defendant, affirmed
Duke's conviction, holding that hybrid representation was not required and that Duke's
behavior constituted a waiver of his right to proceed pro se. It is arguable, however,
that the trial court's limitations on the ability of Duke to proceed partially pro se vitiated
the pretrial "agreement" and any supposed waiver of pro se rights. Also, although the
fickleness of Duke was significant, a last minute request to make the opening statement
hardly placed a significant impediment into the trial process.
95. See cases cited at note 41 supra.
96. Counsel is simply left free to proceed as he desires. See Vess v. Peyton,
352 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 953 (1966); Spears v. United
States, 250 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.W. Va. 1966); State v. Banks, 216 Kan. 390, 532 P.2d
1058 (1975); Shelton v. State, 3 Md. App. 394, 239 A.2d 610 (1968). Of course,
if the procedure selected by counsel is ineffective, other remedies may be available to
the defendant on appeal.
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one to be nice.9" If a defendant decides to insist on his own strategy,
he may be forced to proceed pro se even though he has expressed no
desire to do so, on the ground that he has "waived" counsel.08 The
attorney, if locked into the case by the rules restricting withdrawal of
counsel or granting of late pro se requests, must decide whether to
alienate his client by insisting upon his own notion of his client's best
interests or to acquiesce in his client's wishes. The latter choice risks
a later charge of ineffective assistance of counsel.90
For example, in United States v. Bridgeman ° ° one of the defend-
ants in a multiparty conspiracy trial arising out of a prison disturbance
desired to place nine inmate witnesses on the stand, despite his trial
attorney's objections to the use of some of the witnesses. The court
was informed of the disagreement before the presentation of the de-
fendant's case-in-chief and was told that the parties were attempting
to work things out.101 The attorney called three witnesses, one of
whom he had specifically noted hesitancy about putting on the
stand.'0 2  Only after the testimony of all three witnesses was complete
and the damage caused by the evidence was clear, did counsel refuse
to call any further witnesses.' 03
97. See, e.g., Green v. Virginia, 180 S.E.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1971) (defendant's
contempt conviction reversed; trial judge had held him in contempt for failing to agree
to counsel's demands).
98. See cases cited at note 60 supra.
99. United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973).
100. 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976). [Ed.]
The author was counsel for defendant Johnson on appeal. His complete file of the
case is available for reference at his office, Georgetown University Law Center, 600
New Jersey Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001.
101. Record of Feb. 25, 1974 at 934, United States v. Bridgeman, Cr. No. 852-
73 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1974). Such a dialogue probably met whatever obligations pres-
ently rest with a trial court to make an inquiry into an attorney-client squabble. See
Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911
(1959). The court, however, was in no position to know the extent of the squabbles
occurring in the cell block. Although it might have been appropriate for the court
to have made more inquiries about the disagreement, Brown appears to place much
of the burden of prompt disclosure upon counsel. Id. at 366.
102. Record of Feb. 23, 1974 at 910-11, United States v. Bridgeman, Cr. No. 852-
73 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1974).
103. The disagreement between the defendant and his attorney over witness calling
culminated in a lengthy dialogue between the court, defendant, counsel for the accused,
and the prosecutor. It occurred between the time the second witness had testified and
the calling of the third witness. Record of Feb. 25, 1974 at 993-1023, United States
v. Bridgeman, Cr. No. 852-73 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1974). The trial court eventually ruled
that the attorney controlled the decision to call all witnesses except the defendant him-
self. Id. at 1012, 1023. After a bad experience with the third witness, the trial attorney
refused to call any more witnesses to the stand. Id. at 1033. The defendant decided
to testify, and the defense then rested, wearily.
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The Bridgeman trial illustrates the dilemmas created by applica-
tion of the traditional rules. Appointed counsel was confronted with
a client who desired counsel,104 but wanted to control counsel's tactics.
The court was confronted with a defendant who refused either to pro-
ceed totally pro se or to acquiesce quietly in the notion that counsel
controls trial tactics. The defendant was obliged to deal with counsel
not of his choosing who indicated an unwillingness to behave according
to the defendant's notions of proper trial strategy. Inevitably, the out-
come in Bridgeman was unsatisfactory: the judge, constrained by tra-
ditional rules, could offer little to subdue the defendant except
speeches extolling counsel; the defense counsel acted but partially as
his client desired; and the defendant came away convicted and unsatis-
fied.
As might be expected, appellate courts are highly unlikely to
reverse a conviction for any reason related to the "prejudice" caused
by defendants who boldly told their lawyers what to do. Whether it
be court or counsel, or both, that permitted a defendant to influence
trial strategy, convictions have been routinely affirmed. 10 5 This was the
result in Bridgeman. On appeal it was contended that the trial coun-
sel's acceptance of a significant part of the defendant's trial strategy,
without support of a waiver of counsel, violated the defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel. The court responded:
We reject appellant's attempt to reverse his position at trial and now
to protest trial counsel's decision to accede to his insistent demands
that all nine witnesses be called: he cannot play both sides of the street.
He repeatedly tried, with limited success, to overrule his attorney's
determinations concerning the calling of witnesses. The fact that
deliberation on this issue was lengthy and intense and was conducted
under the court's supervision undermines appellant's attack on trial
counsel's judgment; that the attorney's position largely prevailed
suggests he did not abdicate his fundamental responsibility to manage
the defense.' 0 6
The court, at least in part, concluded that the defendant got what he
deserved for his intervention in the trial process.
104. That the defendant never asked to proceed pro se does not answer the more
pertinent question: whether the defendant's behavior was equivalent to a waiver of the
right either to control the flow of witnesses or to enjoy the effective assistance of an
attorney in the limited area of witness flow. See Section IV(A) infra.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Terranova, 309 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1962); Duke
v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958).
106. 523 F.2d at 1118,19. The court's characterization of the dispute-specifically,
that judicial supervision was constant and that thorough dialogue on the control problem




Although such muted hostility does not answer the difficult
problems raised by mixed representation cases, it does, ironically, indi-
cate the right direction. Putting aside the pejorative content of
opinions like Bridgeman, the cases reveal an unarticulated notion that
"active" represented defendants waive their right to effective counsel
for the complete trial. To whatever degree appellate courts refuse to
permit a defendant's tactical change of heart'0 7 to be vindicated on ap-
peal, a decision is made that the constitutional right to effective counsel
has been waived for part of the trial by the conduct of the defendant.
The general failure of the appellate courts to require specific waiver
hearings by trial courts reveals an unwillingness to follow through on
the natural consequences of their de facto mixed representation hold-
ings. Although the exact content of such a waiver inquiry is for later
discussion, 0 8 the idea that a partial waiver of effective counsel is at
issue begins the task of placing the mixed representation cases in their
proper legal context. °9
B. Pro Se Defendants and Advisory Counsel
The anomalies illustrated by the Bridgeman case have their
analogs in the mixed representation cases arising after defendants make
requests to proceed completely pro se. As a general rule, appointment
of advisory counsel to assist a pro se defendant is usually permitted and
sometimes strongly urged."' Advisory counsel is instructed to act
fully in accordance with the desires of the defendant. Whether the
defendant may use advisory counsel as a spokesman, however, rests in
the trial court's discretion."' Thus, where the court has prohibited
counsel from speaking on the defendant's behalf," 2 the defendant must
107. Often the change of heart arises because counsel changes from trial to appeal.
That appellate counsel's decision to change strategy in Bridgeman is not permitted to
bind the defendant provides an interesting irony to the case.
108. See text accompanying notes 124-45, 175-80 infra.
109. Reported appellate cases with "active" defendants began to appear in notice-
able numbers only after World War II. See cases cited at note 4 supra. The relatively
recent growth of the right to counsel has now assured most defendants access to counsel.
Historically, there has been a shift from almost total pro se representation to almost
total representation by counsel. See generally BEANEY, supra note 71. It should not
be surprising to find that once a right to counsel was established, some defendants would
find it difficult to accept the new order. That new order, however, has produced a
questionable rigidity operating against a defendant's personal participation in his defense.
110. See cases cited at note 101 supra. See also Comment, The Pro Se Defendant's
Right to Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L.R. 927 (1977); Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant and
the Right to Prepare a Defense, 86 YALE L.J. 292 (1976).
111. See cases cited at note 91 supra.
112. United States v. Conder, 43 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958
(1970). See also United States v. Pomeroy, 485 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. cases
cited at note 60 supra (defendant proceeds pro se when confronted with "choice" be-
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either do all the talking himself or risk loss of the right to proceed pro
se." 8  In essence, use of the pro se route to compel mixed represen-
tation has occurred, but as a matter of grace rather than of right.
Despite the rigidity of the developing rules, some cases are re-
ported in which defendants and advisory counsel have jointly presented
a case." 4  Later claims that such mixed representation denied a de-
fendant his right to proceed pro se have been met with expected dis-
favor."15 In this context, at least, the finding of a partial waiver of sixth
amendment rights may be based on some facts in the record. For ex-
ample, in Bayless v. United States'" the defendant proceeded pro se
with a retained advisory counsel during the pretrial period. For the
trial the defendant noted that "he wanted counsel to fully represent
him, except that he himself was to have the right, after his counsel had
cross-examined witnesses, to himself further cross examine them.""
' 7
The trial court's acceptance of this arrangement was affirmed on ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit noting that the defendant was permitted to pro-
ceed pro se to the exact extent he desired."
8
To whatever extent courts refuse to permit pro se defendants to
use their advisory counsel as spokesmen, or find waiver of the right
to proceed pro se when defendants turn to advisory counsel for such
assistance, the same dilemmas arise as in cases where counsel was initi-
ally retained or assigned. If the court denies access to partial counsel
an effective waiver of counsel is forced upon the defendant. If partial
reliance upon counsel leads to a judicial denial of pro se activity, an
effective waiver has also occurred. The failure of the judiciary to make
careful inquiry into the waiver problems is a serious oversight.
tween specified appointed counsel and a pro se defense or between total trial control
by counsel and a pro se trial).
113. A court that relies on partial waiver of counsel to grant the type of mixed
representation in which advisory counsel may speak on defendant's behalf may find
it impossible to return later to a total pro se condition. See, e.g., People v. Lindsey,
17 Ill. App. 3d 137, 308 N.E.2d 111 (1974). The trial court initially permitted the
defendant to proceed pro se with an assistant able to speak during the trial, but later
withdrew counsel's right to participate. The conviction was reversed on the correct
ground that the defendant had made only a partial waiver of counsel. See generally
Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se De-
fendant, supra note 45.
114. United States v. Pomeroy, 485 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67
(9th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970).
115. United States v. Pomeroy, 485 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1973).
116. 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).




C. Multiple Defendant Cases
The only instances in which defendants have been successful in
compelling a court to grant a species of mixed representation are mul-
tiple defendant cases.119 For instance, in United States v. Anderson 2 '
numerous defendants were tried on charges of breaking into the Cam-
den Selective Service Offices and destroying files; some of the defend-
ants proceeded pro se, and others retained counsel. 2 ' As a result of
the mixed representation, the defendants as a group were able to pre-
sent both moving personal appeals and precise legal arguments in a way
not available to the usual single defendant.' 2 2  One searches in vain
for a reason why co-defendants may command the court to provide
them with mixed representation at trial while single defendants may
not. Although some co-defendants have differing interests requiring
independent decisions by different counsel, many co-defendants do
proceed to trial with common goals. Particularly in situations where
the defendants act as a coherent group, they may make effective partial
waivers of both counsel and the right to proceed pro se if certain of
them totally waive while others totally accept counsel.
The inconsistencies in the present system are resolvable only by
accepting the clear consequence of Faretta that the scope of defendant
participation in the trial must be decided by the defendant. The real
issues for the future concern not the scope of proceedings in which
counsel must be provided,.2 3 but the implementation of the defendant's
right to shape the presentation of his defense. Redefining the waiver
119. E.g., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 425. U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Anderson, Cr. No. 602-71 (D.N.J. May
18, 1973).
120. Cr. No. 602-71 (D.N.J. May 18, 1973). The trial resulted in an acquittal.
121. Among retained counsel was David Kairys of Philadelphia, who kindly per-
mitted my research assistant to review parts of the case transcript.
122. The case was an extraordinary example of -how gifted speakers as defendants
can effectively aid technically competent counsel in a mixed representation situation.
In addition, the case presented an interesting study in jury nullification. The pro se
defendants were permitted to discuss jury nullification in their opening and closing state-
ments. In addition, the involvement of government agents in the preparation of the
break-in led the judge to instruct the jury that they could acquit if they found that
"the over-whelming participation by . . . Government agents or informers . . . was so
fundamentally unfair [as] to be offensive to the basic standards of decency, and shock-
ing to the universal sense of justice." Record at 8729, United States v. Anderson, No.
602-71 (D.N.J. May 18, 1973).
123. See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Criminal Justice
Act of 1964, 1S U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1976).
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standards governing a defendant's sixth amendment fights to proceed
both pro se and with counsel is the first step.
IV
IMPLEMENTING MIXED REPRESENTATION
A. Waiver and Notice
The Court in Faretta carefully held that the right to proceed pro
se has a basis in the sixth amendment independent from that of the
right to be represented by counsel. 124  When a defendant agrees to
have counsel appointed, he in essence waives his fight to proceed pro
se. Similarly, when a defendant proceeds pro se, he waives his fight
to be represented by counsel. The complimentary nature of the fights
makes waiver decisions somewhat peculiar. This is especially true
when defendants select a mixed form of representation, thereby waiv-
ing and accepting certain aspects of each fight.
For example, the court of appeals in the Bridgeman case,1 5 with-
out careful discussion of the issue, essentially held that the defendant
waived part of his fight to effective counsel by his demands that coun-
sel present certain witnesses. The appellate court should have in-
quired whether the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of counsel, at least for the limited task of selecting witnesses.12  Fail-
ure to make such an inquiry ignores the teaching of Johnson v.
Zerbst'27 that counsel is deemed waivable only by a knowing and in-
telligent decision12  or by behavior making the implementation of the
right impossible.' 29 There is no theoretical reason why a partial waiver
of counsel is any less crucial than a total waiver. In fact, where de-
fendants have asked and been permitted to proceed pro se in the
middle of their trials, the Zerbst standard has been applied.' 30  Thus,
in Bridgeman an effective waiver should not have been found, at least
not for the reasons given in the opinion. 8'
124. 422 U.S. at 819 n.15.
125. See notes 100-06 supra and accompanying text.
126. The court of appeals refused to reconsider the case when the waiver issues
raised by its opinion were pointed out in a petition for rehearing. Order of Jan. 9,
1976. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the same issue. 425 U.S. 961 (1976).
127. 304U.S. 458 (1938).
128. Id. at 464. See also Brewer v. Williams, 45 U.S.L.W. 4287, 4292 (U.S. Mar.
23, 1977).
129. United States v. Munn, 507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968
(1974); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Illinois
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Waiver by obstreperous behavior was not at issue in
the Bridgeman case.
130. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 273 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1959).
131. There was a lengthy dialogue between the court and the defendant on the
witness control issue. It occurred after the testimony of the crucial second witness
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Moving in the opposite direction-that is, permitting a pro se
defendant to obtain counsel for some or all of his trial-presents more
difficult theoretical problems. No case has ever held that waiver of
pro se rights must be made on the Zerbst standard. Even after
Faretta it is not obvious that pro se rights, in the average case where
counsel is assigned and accepted, must be specifically waived on the
record at all. Nor is it well established that routine notice must be
given to defendants that there is anything to waive. In fact, the pre-
Faretta cases generally hold the opposite.182  Although the notion of
counsel's superior knowledge and the concern for judicial efficiency
may no longer control the ability to grant or deny total or partial pro
se requests, it does not automatically follow that notice of the right to
proceed pre se, or a particularized finding of waiver of pro se rights,
must be made in every case. It could be argued that persons request-
ing total or partial pro se representation should be accommodated for
the reasons already stated, but that no effort should be made to encour-
age either total or partial pro se proceedings by routine notifications
at arraignment. 13 3  Such a theory, however, is untenable. Although
overt waiver inquiries are not required for every right granted by the
Constitution, the right to proceed pro se may not be deemed one of
those quiescent rights. Several factors indicate that only a knowing and
intelligent decision will support a waiver of pro se rights.
The development of the appropriate manner to present the
defense is a process reserved to the defendant.13 4 As a general propo-
sition, those rights subject to waiver only under the Zerbst standards
are closely related to the trial itself. They are the areas in which the
courts have deemed it absolutely essential to protect the defendant's
freedom to be irrational. Thus, a defendant may waive a full trial only
after a knowing and intelligent decision,3 5 may be removed from the
courtroom only after being clearly warned of his right to remain and
for the defense. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. The implication in the
opinion that the dialogue occurred earlier is incorrect. See 523 F.2d at 1118. If the
dialogue had occurred earlier it might have provided the basis for a Zerbst waiver. The
defendant said that it was his case and that he had to take chances with inmates as
witnesses because they were the only people at the scene. Record of Feb. 25, 1974
at 1008-09. One further question like, "Do you waive the right to effective counsel
for purposes of witness selection?" could have ended the matter.
132. United States ex rel. Soto v. United States, 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. White, 429 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Brown v. United States, 264
F.2d 363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959); State v. Smith, 215 N.W.2d
225 (Iowa 1974). But see United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
133. This assumes that no substantial disagreement has surfaced between counsel
and client. In the squabble cases a duty of inquiry exists which might require, in rare
cases, notification of the right to proceed pro se. See cases cited at note 41 supra,
134. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975).
135. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
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confront witnesses,"8 6 and, as already stated, may waive counsel only
after being told of his right to representation. 1 7  Nothing is more cru-
cial to the presentation of a trial defense than who will do the speak-
ing. The policies supporting Zerbst require that the pro se right be
waived only after a full description of its holding is provided the
defendant.38
None of the Supreme Court waiver cases refusing to apply Zerbst
apply to the pro se setting. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte8 9 the Court
held that the stringent Zerbst waiver standards do not apply to the ob-
taining of consent to a noncustodial search of an automobile by the
police. Rather, the question of consent is to be analyzed in light of
the totality of circumstances. Actual knowledge of the right to refuse
to permit the search is only one factor to be taken into account in making
the waiver finding.' 40 In distinguishing Zerbst Mr. Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court in Schneckloth, said:
[A] strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaran-
teed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the
greatest possible opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitu-
tional model of a fair criminal trial. Any trial conducted in deroga-
tion of that model leaves open the possibility that the trial reached an
unfair result precisely because all the protections specified in the Con-
stitution were not provided. A prime example is the right to counsel.
For without that right, a wholly innocent accused faces the real and
substantial danger that simply because of his lack of legal expertise
he may be convicted.'
4 '
136. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
137. Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). Acceptance of pleas may be
compared to control of a trial. Boykin emphasizes the importance of defendant's under-
standing the nature of a trial before a guilty plea may be entered. By analogy, a defend-
ant should be told that he may speak for himself if he elects not to plead guilty. Plead-
ing is like selecting oneself as spokesman.
138. In addition to looking directly at the fundamental nature of the decision in-
volved, the Faretta Court looked to the first amendment to support its refusal to impose
a particular mode of trial presentation upon a defendant making a decision to proceed
pro se. 422 U.S. at 834 n.45. It is also highly significant that the doctrine of harmless
error was not applied in Faretta. Both these aspects of the case indicate the special
nature of the pro se right: it is taken so seriously that its irrational exercise may over-
come the strong judicial preference for trial with counsel for all defendants but those
deemed incompetent to make a waiver decision at all.
139. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
140. Id. at 227.
141. Id. at 241. The Court noted that the fourth amendment search and seizure
guarantees were not a fundamental aspect of the trial process and that they should
therefore not be surrounded with strict waiver standards. Id. at 242-43. Cf. Stone
v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976) (where state gives a fair opportunity to litigate fourth
amendment claims, those issues cannot again be raised in a federal habeus corpus pro-
ceeding becaue of the limited justification for the exclusionary rule); see text accom-
panying note 194 infra.
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Although pointing to the trial as the Zerbst controlled area, the sug-
gestion that fairness of the trial is the objective protected by Zerbst
causes some difficulty; it could be argued that Faretta does not protect
the right to a fair trial but endangers it."42
Three reasons compel that this reading of Schneckloth, Zerbst,
and Faretta be rejected. First, refusal to notify defendants of pro se
rights for fairness reasons conflicts with Faretta's holding that a defend-
ant may proceed pro se, even if his desire is irrational and likely to
result in an objectively unfair trial. Faretta thus suggests that the
balancing approach used in fourth amendment cases is inappropriate
in determining the standards that govern waiver of the right to proceed
pro se. That the court may prefer a certain choice provides an unsatis-
factory basis for failing to require an inquiry into the knowledge and
intelligence upon which the defendant's choice is based. In fact, Faretta,
Zerbst and Schneckloth work well together if the protected area is de-
fined as the core of choices surrounding the mode by which a defense
is presented, rather than merely the due process notion of a fair trial.
Second, it would be anomalous if a defendant could obtain mixed
representation, on the one hand, by accepting most of counsel's assist-
tance and then waiving part of it under Zerbst; and, on the other, by
demanding to proceed pro se and then waiving part of his pro se rights
without any waiver inquiry at all. The two rights are so intimately
related that a waiver of either should be based upon the same stand-
ard. 4 ' The Court's reference in Schneckloth to waiver of counsel as
a Zerbst controlled area should be sufficient to resolve the Faretta
question as well.
142. To this extent Schneckloth leaves us near the starting blocks. The federal
cases are also unclear on whether a trial court must notify a represented defendant
of his personal right to decide whether to testify at trial if his counsel indicates a desire
not to use him, or of his personal right not to testify if his counsel indicates a desire
for him to do so. Presumably, cases requiring such notice at trial would tell us that
it is not solely the notion of a fair trial that the waiver concepts protect, but also
the defendant's perception of his chance for a fair trial. In one case, an appellant
contended he should have been warned when his testimony became highly incriminatory.
United States v. Escandar, 465 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1972). The difficulty of implement-
ing such a rule led the court to affirm the conviction, holding aside the question whether
warnings might generally be required. See Section IV(C) infra for the implications
of the fifth amendment cases in pro se trials.
143. This intimacy would not obviously exist when a defendant elects to stand
mute and to waive both his right to counsel and his right to proceed pro se. Cf. United
States ex reL Testamark v. Vincent, 496 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1974) (conviction affirmed
where defendant, denied his request of a particular lawyer, stood mute at trial, refusing
both assigned counsel and pro se representation). The judiciary's choice of attorney,
however, should not control a defendant's decision to waive both counsel and pro se
representation, as well as the rights to confront witnesses, present a defense, and testify.
Such a defendant would still force the state to prove its case. As long as Zerbst waiver
inquiries are properly made, such a "mute" trial appears perfectly legitimate. See United
States ex rel. Davis v. Jennings, 414 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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Finally, telling a defendant that he may have counsel does not
provide all the information necessary to decide the pro se question.
The routine assignment of counsel, often prior to any appearance be-
fore a judge, commonly results in a fait accompli by the time arraign-
ment is completed. In addition, full description of the risks of pro se
representation is an integral part of the decision to accept or reject
counsel. To whatever degree the courts feel that partial or complete
pro se representation is likely to be an unwise choice, they are free
gently to discourage defendants from proceeding alone.' The right
of a judge to discourage, however, may not also be the basis for hiding
the existence of the right. Rather, the freedom of the courts to dis-
courage pro se trials is part of the underlying knowledge upon which
a defendant must base his intelligent choice about use of counsel.'
45
Admittedly, there are limits to the specificity of notice that can
be given at arraignment. In fact, to impose a completely rigid set of
warnings upon a defendant at that stage would be unwise, because
viable choices about modes of defense presentation may not yet be
known. A defendant may easily be told, however, that he may proceed
pro se, by counsel, or in combination; 14 6 that if counsel is desired in
any capacity that choice must be made before trial to avoid undue
delay; and that if counsel is accepted the defense team will not be per-
mitted to change strategies in the middle of a trial when that course
of action would cause undue confusion and delay.'
47
144. See United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). The word
"gently" is advisedly used. Care must be taken to avoid jeopardizing a Zerbst waiver
of pro se rights or of counsel by overly strong judicial remarks.
145. The Second Circuit has accepted this approach, requiring trial judges to in-
quire as to defendant's choice between representation by counsel and proceeding pro se.
United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964). Cases from the D.C. Circuit
appear to suggest that a defendant who makes a justified complaint about his attorney
may have a right to be informed of his pro se right. See United States v. Jones, 514
F.2d 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1959).
146. The latter option assumes that defendants may proceed as of right with mixed
representation-a position not yet adopted by the courts. See cases cited at note 88
supra. Assuming, however, that Faretta entitles defendants to mixed representation,
then a court that affords the accused notice of his right to proceed pro se should also
notify him of his right to mixed representation. If total and partial waivers of counsel
and total waivers of the right to proceed pro se must be made on the Zerbst standard,
then partial pro se waivers cannot be distinguished.
147. See Dearinger v. United States, 344 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1965) (midtrial change
of plans acceptable where no significant disruption or delay likely to result). The
court's discretion to permit midtrial changes should be exercised as freely as possible
because of the importance of the rights involved; however, the need of trial courts to
control their dockets will eventually overtake the desires of some defendants to alter
their pretrial agreements. See Section V(D) infra.
The pro se notice and waiver questions raise by implication a whole series of other
waiver-notice questions. If a court must routinely notify a defendant of his right to
proceed pro se or in mixed form, why should a defendant, even though represented
by counsel, not be notified of a wide variety of other rights or strategic choices? Al-
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Because the assignment question generally arises very early in the
trial process, only the court, an agent of the court, or an attorney, is
ordinarily available to provide basic information to the defendant upon
which he may base a representation decision. Although early notice
by the trial court to the defendant of the available options should be
required, determining the exact nature of any combined representation
may be postponed until after arraignment, when counsel has had a
chance to speak to the defendant in some detail about his upcoming
trial. Any pretrial hearing at which the waivers necessitated by mixed
representation find their way into the record may well be influenced
by advice of counsel on a number of issues.
B. The Role of Counsel
The advent of mixed representation and the notice-waiver
doctrines surrounding it creates two significant sets of problems for the
Bar. First, to the extent that time limitations prevent trial courts from
describing many details of the trial process to defendants, the burden
of transferring information will shift to defense counsel. Describing the
scope of this duty is important not only for the implementation of mixed
representation, but also for proper delineation of sixth amendment stand-
ards for effective assistance of counsel. Second, Faretta compels the
organized Bar to revise its ethical norms. The existing rules on accept-
ance and withdrawal from criminal cases and control of tactics need to
be carefully examined.
1. The Duty to Provide Information
Faretta requires that counsel act as an assistant as well as a boss.
Playing a secondary role in part of the trial, while functioning as advo-
cate in those spheres relinquished to him by the defendant, places
counsel in a complex position.148  The trouble many lawyers will ex-
though a general statement that a defendant has the right to proceed pro se in whole
or in part theoretically covers any possible area of the trial, why not describe in some
detail the various parts of the trial process and the multitude of functions that a defense
attorney has traditionally performed? At some point limitations on judicial time will
prevent detailed descriptions of the trial process to defendants at arraignment. Notifica-
tion of the right to proceed pro se or in a mixed fashion, together with an admonition
to defense counsel to review fully the trial process with his client, should suffice for
constitutional purposes. This is not to say, however, that detailed judicial notice might
not be required later if a problem should arise, or that a defendant proceeding entirely
pro se might not have to be given more information by the court than a represented
defendant. See Section IV(D) infra.
148. But schizophrenic advocacy is not a novel role for counsel. His duty to repre-
sent his client zealously obligates him at times to follow his clients wishes even though
he thinks them unwise and at other times to pursue what he believes are his client's
best interests. See generally ABA CODE, supra note 44, Canon 7; M. FREEDMAN, LAW-
YER'S ETmics IN ANADvErsAy Sygrnm 27-42 (1975).
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perience in adapting to their new role dichotomy is the most difficult
long-term problem emerging from Faretta. The obligation to follow
a defendant's desires in trial preparation and strategy has few clearly
definable limits.' 49 The trial of a mixed representation case may pre-
sent the attorney with a moral dilemma so serious that a conflict of
interest arises; 150 in this case permissive withdrawal is the only realistic
solution available to the unhappy attorney. To the extent that the
courts refuse to permit withdrawal under such circumstances, 1 1 Faretta
will in effect substitute some of the tensions of defendants with those
of counsel.'
52
The developing torts doctrine of informed consent provides a
useful model for the new ethical role of counsel.'53 In general, the
149. See THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 6 § 3.7. The most obvious limits
are those associated with the obligation not to commit criminal offenses, such as threat-
ening witnesses or tampering with a jury.
150. See cases cited at note 38 supra; THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 6, §
3.5(a).
151. If past performance is any guide, see Section I supra, courts are likely to
refuse such withdrawals, especially if the motions are made close to the date set for
trial.
152. It is appropriate that those who operate the courts and perform within them,
as well as the defendants, accept some of the difficulties caused by pursuing a trial
fair in the mind of the defendant as well as fair to the court. The increased tension
placed upon counsel by Faretta, together with its personalization of the defense, do,
however, coalesce to command additional flexibility in the assignment and change of
counsel.
153. Disputes over the proper roles of professionals and their clients rage not only
in law, but also in psychiatry, medicine, and industrial relations. A spectrum of rela-
tionships from the guiding professional and the subservient client to the demanding cli-
ent and the acquiescing professional is described in the literature in all these areas.
The most recent description of the general problem, along with a compendium of cita-
tions to the literature, may be found in D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 5, at 7-28. Rosen-
thal describes the polar types of clients as follows:
According to the traditional theory the client who is passive, follows instruc-
tions, and trusts the professional without criticism, with few questions or re-
quests, is preferable and will do better than the difficult client who is critical
and questioning. . . . The participatory theory promotes an active strategy
assuming that it is primarily the client's own responsibiility to grapple with
the problem. Instead of delegating responsibility to the professional and leav-
ing the decisions to him while being kept only minimally informed, the par-
ticipating client seeks information to help him define his problem and what
he wants to accomplish, rather than waiting to be told how to proceed.
Id. at 13-14.
Rosenthal's conclusion that the participating client has a beneficial impact on the
outcome of his own litigation suggests that much more study needs to be done on the
impact of the attorney-client relationship upon case outcome. The lack of such studies
in the criminal field makes it impossible to reach any conclusions about the impact
of Faretta in individual cases. The prevalence of disputes in many server-client areas
about the proper role of clients, however, should support the use of informed consent
theories in the criminal defense context. The informed consent doctrine intimately in-
volves considerations of the value of active and passive clients. For a general discussion
of the doctrine see J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION wrrH HUMAN BEINGS 523-734 (1972);
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doctrine requires doctors to inform patients of material risks prior to
undertaking a course of medical treatment. The definition of material
risk varies in the case law from risks that would be disclosed by a
reasonable practitioner in the community, to dangers that a reasonable
man would regard as material to the medical decision under scrutiny.'
Whichever standard applies, the doctrine requires that a patient be per-
mitted to refuse treatment, even for irrational reasons, once informed
of the material risks. The analogy to Faretta is compelling.""
For example, suppose that the previously suggested mode for
assignment of counsel' 56 had been followed in Bridgeman;57 namely,
that the defendant had elected at arraignment to permit the appoint-
ment of counsel, but had left open the possibility that he would not
permit counsel total control over the trial. Suppose further that as pre-
trial preparation of the case developed, the defendant told his lawyer
that he wanted nine witnesses called. Other than to interview the sug-
gested witnesses, what are the attorney's obligations?
Traditionally, an attorney appointed to represent such a defendant
would simply decide whether the testimony of any or all of the pro-
posed witnesses would be used at trial.1 "s  Under an informed consent
Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 340 (1974); Comment, Informed Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medi-
cal Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 548 (1973); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying
Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Informed Consent and the
Dying Patient].
154. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, supra note 153, at 1636-
43. The first standard requires expert testimony on local community medical norms
and relies upon medical practitioners to set their own standards. The more modern
cases have moved to the second test, which requires no expert testimony, but instead
relies upon the jury to balance the magnitude of the risk with the seriousness of the
medical problems involved.
155. The most important difference between law and medicine is remedy. Harm
resulting from failure of a doctor to disclose risks may be compensated with damages
should the unstated risk occur; this remedy, however, is likely to be unavailable to the
average defendant in a criminal case. Very often the criminal defendant turned civil
plaintiff will not be able to prove that any harm resulted from the civil wrong. Al-
though nominal damages might be appropriate, they will not deter malpractice. Reli-
ance on punitive damages is risky. Finally, the most important concern of the defend-
ant-plaintiff may be freedom rather than money. Civil remedies will not meet this
need. A defendant must look to the appellate courts to structure deterrent rules to
control overreaching by trial lawyers. Such rules are likely to arise in appellate dis-
putes over Zerbst-Faretta waivers. Bar disciplinary proceedings may be helpful over
the long haul, but defendants in individual cases languishing in jail will take little solace
from the knowledge that their old attorneys are now selling peanuts.
156. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
157. See notes 100-06 supra and accompanying text.
158. The traditional obligation of the attorney to discuss the matter with the client
in no way diminishes counsel's equally strong duty to present the case in the way most




model the attorney should reveal to the defendant the reasons why cer-
tain witnesses should be used and others should not, the danger in the
recommended course of action, the alternatives to the recommended
path, and the benefits likely to accrue from each strategy, The final
choice as to both the calling of the witnesses and the selection of the
person to elicit the testimony would be left with the accused. Taking
the liberty of substituting legal for medical terminology in a quotation
from a medical malpractice opinion, the attorney would be guided by
the following general restrictions:
[I]n due deference to the '[client's] right to self determination, a
[lawyer] is bound to disclose all the known material risks peculiar to
the proposed procedure. Materiality may be said to be the signifi-
cance a reasonable person, in what the [lawyer] knows or should
know is his [client's] position, would attach to the disclosed risk or
risks in deciding whether to submit or not to submit to [the lawyer's
recommendations]. Among the factors which point to the danger-
ousness of a [legal tactic] are the severity of the risk and the likeli-
hood of its occurrence.
159
Defining the term material risk, and thus defining the standard of
disclosure, might be slightly more difficult in law than in medicine.
Insofar as medical risk is scientifically discernible, choices may be more
easily described to a patient than a client.160 The informed consent
theory, however, relying on concepts of reasonable behavior, is flexible
enough to absorb whatever predictability problems arise. That much
medical risk cannot be described scientifically has not prevented the
development of informed consent theory in tort.
Informed consent theory fits snugly with the basic notion of
Faretta that the preparation of the defense is controlled by the ac-
159. Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 627-28, 295 A.2d 676, 689 (1972), dis-
cussed in Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, supra note 153, at 1639-
43. The Wilkinson court goes on to add that even a very small chance of death or
serious disability may be relevant, and that the potential gain of a treatment should
be weighed against its risks. In the legal context similar reasoning would compel greater
care with high risk cases, especially death penalty or long term imprisonment situations.
Although the courts have to this point been unwilling to admit that more competent
or ethical counsel should be required in serious cases, judges usually act with special
care in such trials. See B. PREa'IMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 305,
308-11 (1961). This natural human response, though difficult to implement in indi-
vidual cases, is still an appropriate consideration in the informed consent area. Surely,
lawyers must take special care to inform their clients of the smallest risk when death
is a possible outcome of a trial.
160. It could also be argued that medical decisions usually focus only on the doctor
and the patient, while legal choices involve the lawyer, client, and an unpredictable
adversary. The variety of familial, social, and employment situations of patients and
clients, however, makes it difficult to hazard a guess that the human side of a medical
decision is any less complex than that of a criminal trial.
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cused. 16' The disclosure duty rests on a theory of what a reasonable
defendant, not a reasonable attorney, may seek to know. It also pro-
vides workable appellate standards by preserving the ability of the court
to control unreasonable demands by defendants and protecting attor-
neys from making precise factual judgments in areas where exactitude
is impossible.
2. The Ethical Norms
The organized Bar has accepted the traditional dominance of
counsel in areas of trial tactics. Ethical rules describing an attorney's
obligation to accept indigent criminal cases and the dominance of coun-
sel at trial fail to provide any insight into the impact of Faretta.
As one might expect, generally accepted ethical norms require an
attorney to make every reasonable effort to create and maintain a good
relationship with his client. 6 2  Such a relationship is the theoretical
foundation relied upon by lawyers to obtain all facts necessary for the
presentation of a defense. 10 3 The norms do not, however, reveal any
concern about the obstacles to a decent lawyer-client relationship intro-
duced by Faretta. Although a lawyer is not under an "obligation to
act as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become
his client,"' 64 he is limited to refusing assigned criminal cases only for
"compelling reasons." 165 In addition, an attorney may withdraw from
a civil or criminal case in litigation only on the basis of "compelling
circumstances"' 66 and, if required by local rule, with the permission of
the court. Attorneys, therefore, may be compelled to accept criminal
assignments and to remain involved even if the compelled attorney-
client relationship is flawed. In contrast, the Code requires retained
counsel not to accept a case if the client is already represented by coun-
sel, absent the agreement of the other attorney. 167  The same concern
161. Compare the recent growth of law protecting patient control over medical
decisions. See generally Katz, Who's Afraid of Informed Consent?, 4 J. PSYCH. & L.
315 (1976); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, supra note 162; Cantor,
A Patient's Decision to Decline Life Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus
Preservation of Life, 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 228 (1973).
162. THE. DEFENSE FUNcrION, supra note 6, § 3.1; ABA CODE, supra note 44,
EC 7-8.
163. See THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 6, § 3.2; ABA CDE, supra note
44, EC 4-1. See also FREEDmAN, supra note 148, at 1-8.
164. ABA CODE, supra note 44, EC 2-26.
165. Id. EC 2-29,; THE DEFENSE FUNCnoN, supra note 44, § 1.5. The ABA Stand-
ards are based upon the felt need to widen the participation of attorneys in criminal
defense work. Id. § 1.5, Comment. See ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES § 2.2 & Comment (197.2).
166. ABA CODE, supra note 44, EC 2-32.
167. Id. EC 2-30.
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should permit an attorney in a criminal case to refuse to continue when
the defendant has a preference for another.
The ethical norms also strongly imply that mere tactical dis-
agreements do not provide a basis for a withdrawal request. The Code
generally provides that withdrawal is possible when the client's contem-
plated conduct is illegal or makes it unreasonably difficult for the attor-
ney to carry out his employment effectively.168 Mere disagreement over
tactics is unlikely to obstruct an attorney's effectiveness, since counsel
may presently ignore a client's wishes and try the case his own way. In
short, the interplay between the existing ethical and legal rules makes
it highly unlikely that disagreement over trial preparation techniques
or trial strategy will provide a basis for an attorney to be relieved or
for a defendant to obtain a new lawyer. 169 The ethical norms must
168. Id. DR 2-110(C) provides:
(C) Permissive withdrawal.
If DR 2-110(B) is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission
to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in
other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client:
(a) Insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted
under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for
an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
(b) Personally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct.
(c) Insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal
or that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.
(d) By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer
to carry out his employment effectively.
(e) Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer
engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the
lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules.
(f) Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the law-
yer as to expenses or fees.
(2) His continued employment is likely to result in a violation of a
Disciplinary Rule.
(3) His inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interests
of the client likely will be served by withdrawal.
(4) His mental or physical condition renders it difficult for him to carry
out the employment effectively.
(5) His client knowingly and freely assents to termination of his employ-
ment.
(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceeding pending before a tribunal,
that the tribunal will find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal.
169. At trial counsel must control most aspects of trial strategy, although consulting
with his client on matters of importance. THE DEFENSE FUNaION, supra note 6,
§§ 5.2(a)-(b). If a dispute over tactics erupts he must place the nature of the problem
on the record without breaching the attorney-client privilege. Id. § 5.2(c). These
obligations also present great difficulties. For example, why is it proper for a lawyer
to continue in a case when his client disagrees with the manner in which the defense
is to be presented? Does an attorney have an obligation to tell his client of the right
to proceed pro se or to request new counsel? The usual feeling of counsel that pro
se representation does not work well, together with the high ethical obligation to con-
tinue in assigned cases, implies that present ethical rules do not require such notice.
On the other hand, the tensions in an attorney-client relationship may require an attor-
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be modified to reflect the possibility of mixed representation and to
recognize counsel's information transfer duties after Faretta.
C. Effective Counsel, Inarticulate Pro Se
Defendants, and Faretta
1. Standards for Attorney Effectiveness
Attorney skill in the courtroom, or in preparation for trial, has
been the focus of most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
170
When a defendant is deciding how to proceed in a mixed representa-
tion case, however, the central issue as to ineffective assistance will
tend to be counsel's advice rather than his actions.
Advice problems may arise in any case in which a defendant has
permitted counsel to perform some role. Even in pro se cases advisory
counsel will often be appointed to provide information for* an untutored
defendant or continuity should an accused later waive his right to pro-
ceed pro se or lose his right to be present at trial. That such assistance
comes by way of advice, rather than by direction, does not affect its
importance. Absent a complete waiver of effective counsel, therefore,
ineffective assistance rules should apply to measure the competency of
counsel's performance, however slight his role.
Nor should the possible application of the ineffective assistance
rules be ignored because harmless error rules may preclude relief in
mixed representation trials to a greater degree than when counsel is
in total charge. For example, suppose a defendant waived counsel for
all purposes except cross-examination of government witnesses; sup-
pose further not only that defendant's performance was harmful, but
that counsel's cross-examination was ineffective. The standard of re-
view requires that the error resulting from ineffective counsel be harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt in order to affirm the conviction.' 7'
That defendant's participation was harmful, however, does not neces-
sarily mean that counsel's ineffectiveness was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. For effective counsel doctrines to sit comfortably with
ney to make efforts to resolve a dispute, even by taking steps he deems unwise, in
order to preserve decorum before a jury.
170. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 218 (1976); Finer, supra note 35; Grano, supra
note 8; Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, supra note 35.
171. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The circuits differ as to
who bears the burden of persuasion on the Chapman issue. Compare McQueen v. Swen-
son, 498 F.2d 207, 220 (8th Cir. 1974), and United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle,
434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970) (burden on defendant), with United States v. De-
Coster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224,
226 (4th Cir. 1968) (burden on Government).
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Faretta, a careful inquiry is required into the harm caused by counsel
in any area, no matter how small." 2
This analysis is inconsistent with older ineffective assistance cases,
in which a single due process standard was applied to determine the
need for reversal. Little concern was voiced over the question of
harmless error as a separate issue because the concepts of error and
harm were joined in the same standard: the court simply determined
if the trial was a sham or a mockery of justice.17s  Adherence to this
standard is now eroding in favor of a rule requiring normally competent
counsel; 174 nevertheless, in those circuits that retain it the joinder of
harm and error makes analysis of mixed representation cases particu-
larly difficult.
The sham standard is also flawed because it requires that an
attorney be no more effective than a pro se defendant; more than a
fourteenth amendment level of fair performance should be required of
counsel in order to meet sixth amendment minima of effectiveness.
Knowledge of the law, in addition to the ability to argue and communi-
cate, is required of an attorney. A defendant who elects to use some
or all of the abilities of counsel, presumably in part because he thinks
he will be better tried, should be justified in his assumption. To con-
tinue to operate effective assistance of counsel rules on the minimal
fairness protections of the due process clause is to ignore the higher
level of competence expected of counsel by the community. The right
to counsel in the sixth amendment is largely based upon this community
172. The nature and timing of the postverdict inquiry to be made in ineffective
assistance cases is in dispute. Some cases have virtually required counsel on appeal
to institute proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 contemporaneously with the appeal
so that the reviewing court on appeal can decide the sixth amendment claim on a com-
plete record and thereby avoid unnecessary remands. In such cases the primary appeal
is held in abeyance until the district judge has had a chance to review the sixth amend-
ment claims. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
United States v. Tindle, 522 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Since other courts have shown
reluctance to remand cases arising on direct appeal to district courts for evidentiary
hearings or even inquiries on affidavit (e.g., United States v. Huntley, 535 F.2d 1400,
1405 (5th Cir. 1976)), as a general proposition appellate counsel should seek relief
under section 2255 as early as possible in the appeal process.
173. The old sham standard still governs in some circuits, United States v. Yani-
shefsky, 500 F.2d 1327, 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. United States, 485 F.2d 240,
241-42 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Benthiem, 456 F.2d 165, 167 (1st Cir. 1972);
Krutchen v. Eyman, 406 F.2d 304, 312 (9th Cir. 1969).
174. A number of circuits have switched to a standard requiring that counsel be
normally competent. United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 5,10 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334, 1336
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011 (1975); Beasley v. United States, 491
F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3rd Cir.
1970). The Eighth Circuit also appears to be shifting its standard. McQueen v. Swen-
son, 498 F.2d 207, 214,15 (8th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Ramirez, 535
F.2d 125, 129-30 (1st Cir. 1976).
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understanding. The modern effective assistance standard is more con-
sistent with the defendant's expectations in a mixed representation-
or even an advisory counsel--context.
2. Standards for Defendant Competence
The recent development of a more modern effective counsel test,
however, opens up new problems in the interrelationship between
Faretta and the due process clause. Although special quality standards
apply to the activity of counsel sanctioned by the sixth amendment, the
general notion that trials may be so unfair that their verdicts are un-
acceptable applies regardless of the presence of counsel. A Faretta
waiver of the effective assistance of counsel may not completely over-
ride the socially based notions of minimal justice contained in the due
process clause. If it is apparent to the trial court that the defendant
is likely to try some or all of his case in such a farcical manner that a
reversal would be required under the fourteenth amendment, effective
steps must be taken to protect the defendant.
Some examples of cases where overriding notions of justice would
require imposition of effective counsel on defendants are pro se or
mixed trials with defendants mentally incapable of deciding the
counsel/pro se waiver issues;175 completely pro se trials where the de-
fendant's behavior leads to his withdrawal from a courtroom or to his
gagging;1 76 and pro se or mixed trials where a defendant, though capable
of making a waiver decision, is so inarticulate that he is unable to com-
municate with the trier of fact or with witnesses.17  In each case the
court would be obligated to declare a mistrial or appoint counsel to pro-
ceed with the trial. These results are analogous to those cases in which
courts have proceeded to try defendants incompetent to stand trial in
175. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S.
105 (1954); United States ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975);
People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 466 P.2d 710, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970). In Gilmore
v. Utah, 97 S. Ct. 436 (1976), a defendant sentenced to death under a statute of doubtful
constitutionality moved the Supreme Court to terminate its stay of execution. The stay
had been granted pursuant to a petition filed by the defendant's mother raising the
constitutional questions and suggesting that her son was not competent to waive appeal.
The stay was vacated and the competency resolved on the basis of the transcripts of
the hearings at which Gilmore had refused to permit a state appeal to proceed and
reports of state psychiatrists. No adversary hearing on the competency question was
ever held, even after the condemned man attempted suicide. The heretofore clear due
process holding of Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), requiring sua sponte judicial
inquiry when competence is called into question, was not cited or discussed by either
the majority or the dissenters.
176. For fact situations that raise these issues see United States v. Jones, 514 F.2d
1331 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Theriault, 474 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1973).
1.77. Defendants proceeding pro se who are unable to raise bail also may present
difficult due process problems. See Note, The Jailed Pro Se Defendant, supra note 110.
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order to avoid permanent incarceration without the benefit of a ver-
dict.1
71
Extraordinarily inarticulate defendants provide the most difficult
class of cases. Such a defendant-for example, a seriously retarded
individual-though perfectly capable of understanding other people if
they talk simply, may be incapable of carefully phrasing arguments or
questions in anything approaching a logical pattern. He may under-
stand that he has a right to counsel, and that counsel would provide
valuable assistance, but still desire to try the case himself. In such cir-
cumstances the basic requirements of a traditional sixth amendment
waiver of effective counsel may be met.
7 9
Faretta suggests that the court may not impose a sixth amendment
requirement that the defendant be likely to perform well in order to
proceed pro se.'8 0 The likelihood that a defendant will be unable to
perform, however, raises due process problems not dealt with by
Faretta. The court should either find that such a defendant is in-
capable of making a waiver of counsel or permit him to proceed pro
se while intervening in the trial to promote some degree of fair opposi-
tion to the prosecutor. In either case, the court may justify its actions
on the due process notion that some minimal evenness in the operation
of the adversary system is necessary. Just as due process issues like
competency to stand trial are resolved by reviewing the ability of a de-
fendant to understand the social force to be applied, so must the exer-
cise of a Faretta waiver be related to the basic ability of the defendant
to participate directly in the trial process.
3. Comparing the Standards
It might be thought contradictory to measure a pro se or mixed
defendant's trial competence by a general due process fairness standard
while measuring counsel's effectiveness by a higher standard emanating
from the sixth amendment. After all, the right to proceed pro se also
178. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); State v. Lang, 37 Ill. 2d 75,
224 N.E.2d 838 (1967). In Lang, a deaf mute was adjudged incompetent to stand
trial and committed to an institution. A later state habeas petition led to a remand
for a limited trial on those issues for which defendant's personal participation was not
necessary. State ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 236 N.E.2d 109 (1970).
179. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
180. The Faretta court did note at one point that Faretta was "literate, competent,
and understanding." Id. at 835. Exactly what these words connote is not clear. It
is possible that the example in the text of a retarded defendant may involve someone
who is not "literate." The language appears to be inconsistent with the looser standard
suggested earlier in the opinion: "UI]n order to represent himself, the defendant must
knowingly and intelligently [waive his right to counsel]." Id. at 835. One hopes that




arises independently under the sixth amendment. The sixth amend-
ment rights to counsel and to proceed pro se, however, are independ-
ent of each other and different in content. The right to counsel has
been construed as a right to effective assistance; the Faretta pro se right
contains no guaranteed sixth amendment standard of competence.
Waivers of one or the other right are, accordingly, somewhat different
in content. The notice and waiver structure described to this point en-
compasses this difference within it. The primary notion of waiver pro-
tected by Faretta is the right to err. The primary benefit waived is
a competent spokesman. The primary function of the due process
clause is to demand a minimally acceptable level of fairness in all pro-
ceedings. The suggested rules put into effect a system that both pro-
tects the general ability of defendants to make erroneous choices and
prevents most reversals should the general expectations regarding the
ability of pro se defendants prove valid. In essence the new effective
assistance of counsel standards and the fourteenth amendment fairness
standards reflect the likely minimal understandings of the parties prior
to waiving either counsel or the right to proceed pro se.
D. Judicial Efficiency Revisited
Judicial application of the various rules proposed here presents
some theoretical and practical difficulties. First, in what ways must
courts differently treat pro se and represented defendants? Must a
court, for example, ever make evidentiary objections on behalf of a pro
se defendant? Second, under what circumstances do efficiency needs
justify restricting the ability of a defendant to proceed pro se or in a
mixed fashion? At some point the need to proceed speedily and with
as little confusion as possible may justify restricting the whims of a
fickle defendant.
1. Judicial Obligations Under the Due Process Clause to Defendants
Proceeding Pro Se or by Mixed Representation
It is impossible to predict all of the problems that will confront
the courts; nevertheless, several areas profitably may be discussed.
First, accepting the notion that the due process fairness test to be applied
in pro se and mixed cases relates to the ability of a defendant to com-
municate to the triers of fact, the court has fewer obligations with re-
gard to a defendant seeking only to influence counsel's activity than to
a defendant seeking to participate directly in the trial. Similarly, mere
compilation of numerous objections to questions or arguments of a pro
se or mixed defendant would not be fatal to a conviction. Nor would
a series of tactical blunders. Assuming that most legal argument occurs
at the bench and that the prosecutor is not using the legal ineptness
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of the accused as a vehicle for arguing to the jury, no prejudice beyond
that to be expected in a normal pro se case would arise. Traditional
evidential impediments placed upon defendant's communication with
the trier of fact need not be altered for constitutional reasons in most
pro se or mixed trials.
Second, the court would have to pass certain legal information to
a completely pro se accused. In some areas in which counsel has a
burden to inform a defendant of rights and obligations, the duty to
transfer information must be undertaken by the courts. Performing this
duty cannot be expected to substitute for total or partial assignment of
counsel, but it can be expected to raise the possible anarchy of a pro
se adversary trial to minimal levels of organized contentiousness.
The fifth amendment rights to testify or to refuse to testify provide
an intriguing example.18 ' Present law apparently does not require that
the court inform represented defendants of their fifth amendment
rights prior to making a decision on use of their own testimony.3 2 Prior
to Faretta, however, the courts were generally treating pro se defend-
ants differently,1 3 the rationale being that counsel is expected to discuss
testimonial decisions with the defendant in the process of developing
defense strategy. Putting aside for a moment the question of con-
trol over such decisions, the expectation of counsellor warnings was
deemed an adequate substitute for judicial warnings in all but pro se
cases.
A primitive judicial informed consent rule is operating. The de-
cision whether a pro se defendant should personally communicate his
story to the trier of fact is such an important aspect of the trial that
judicial intervention is appropriate. Although a court may not be asked
to perform exactly like counsel under the doctrine of informed consent,
181. Consider also the plea of guilty. A pro se plea should arguably be taken
with much greater care than a plea of a represented defendant.
182. See note 142 supra. The few opinions are from state courts. See People
v. Thomas, 43 Cal. App. 3d 862, 118 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1st Dist. 1974); People v. Smith,
257 Mich. 319, 241 N.W. 186 (1932); People v. Hunley, 63 Mich. App. 97, 234 N.W.2d
169 (1975). Although there may not be an obligation to warn a defendant of his
fifth amendment rights, it is good practice to do so.
183. Again, the cases holding that pro se defendants must be warned are state
cases. People v. Glaser, 238 Cal. App. 2d 819, 48 Cal. Rptr. 427 (lst Dist. 1965);
People v. Kramer, 227 Cal. App. 2d 199, 38 Cal. Rptr. 487 (2d Dist. 1964); State
v. Lucas, 24 Conn. Supp. 353, 190 A.2d 511 (1963); People v. Morett, 272 App. Div.
96, 69 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1947). See also Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 643 (.1961). But see State
v. Lashley, 21 N.C. App. 83, 203 S.E.2d 71 (1974). Cases dealing with a similar
difference in treatment in other areas, such as jury waiver, did not surface in my re-
search. That may be because jury waiver is a decision that must always be made af-
firmatively by someone, while warning on testimonial rights may be passively ignored.
The result would be that records in pro se cases would routinely reflect questions on
the jury issue; no appealable issue would result.
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it may properly be required to provide general information to pro se
defendants of rights guaranteed them by the Constitution, when rele-
vant to any particular trial, or of other rights likely to have serious re-
percussions in a proceeding."'8
Third and finally, it could be argued that a court has the obligation
to intervene whenever a pro se or mixed defendant is about to make
a gaffe of extraordinary dimensions. Although Faretta does not
require the courts to protect a pro se defendant from tactical errors,
at some point a tactical error or a series of them may so diminish the
likelihood of a fair trial that any further efforts on the defendant's part
to communicate to the judge or jury would be in vain. For example,
an unwitting production by a pro se defendant of testimony or exhibits
that affirmatively demonstrate guilt should be screened out, absent a
clear desire on the part of the defendant to plead guilty.',85
Imposing part of the defense function upon the court in pro se and
mixed cases inevitably follows from balancing minimal due process
notions with the sixth amendment right of defendants to represent
themselves. The additional due process burdens imposed in pro se or
mixed cases relate not so much to basic changes in constitutional law
as to the change in the form of representation and the resulting diminu-
tion in sources of knowledge of basic rights available to pro se defend-
ants.
2. Practical Limits to Faretta
Two sets of problem exist in the day-to-day operation of pro se
and mixed representation cases. First, at what point during the trial
process must decisions about legal representation be made? May a de-
fendant elect to proceed pro se or to cross-examine a certain witness
at the last moment? Second, how precise must the courts be in allocat-
ing trial functions in a mixed representation case? May the defendant
demand that questions be framed in a particular way or that his counsel
withdraw a question already asked?
As a general proposition, a knowing and intelligent waiver of a
right does not preclude a change of mind. A waiver assumes "contract"
status only when public policy requires that finality attach to the deci-
184. In addition, minimal knowledge of certain practical housekeeping niceties
should be give to a pro se defendant. That is, the order of the pretrial and trial process,
time limits, and the like should be described for reasons of efficiency, if not due process.
A defendant should be informed of those periods of time when he will be permitted
to communicate with judge and jury.
185. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 23'8 (1969); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1
(1966). It is quite likely that even when represented by counsel, the trial court has
a duty to avoid practical guilty pleas without proper waivers. See id.
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sion. For example, if a defendant decides before the trial begins not
to testify, and says so in a knowing and intelligent way to the trial
court, no one would forbid his later taking the stand. Similarly, if a
decision to proceed pro se is made at arraignment, there would be no
policy reason for denying a request for counsel a week later. To the
contrary, the general assumption that counsel performs better than
a pro se defendant should compel courts to assign counsel to such a
defendant. Although a very late request for counsel might be denied
in rare instances for practical reasons, the "contract" status thus im-
posed upon the waiver of counsel arises for reasons not directly related
to the initial waiver decision.
Before Faretta, courts generally did not permit defendants to
proceed pro se at the last minute.'8 6 Completely dispensing with coun-
sel at the last minute, however, or even in the middle of a trial does
not present undue or unusual practical problems that warrant univer-
sally attaching contract status to an initial waiver of the pro se right.
If counsel is fired because of sixth amendment ineffectiveness, appoint-
ment of new counsel ordinarily leads to a continuance to allow new
counsel time to prepare. Similarly, a defendant who elects to proceed
pro se after dismissing his ineffective counsel should also be provided
time for preparation. Where the pro se choice arises for reasons other
than counsel incompetence, however, the defendant has presumably
waived his right to effective assistance and therefore the trial could usu-
ally proceed without delay.
The defendant who seeks to alter the scope of his waiver of
counsel before or during trial presents an additional problem. The
complexities of mixed representation probably require that once a trial
begins a presumption of waiver stability arise; numerous bench confer-
ences on control issues would be highly inefficient. Resolution of pre-
trial contract changes may easily be handled by delaying the sixth
amendment waiver hearing until immediately before trial.'8 7  The trial
186. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. .1972); United
States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1968).
187. Control issues may also arise in pretrial motion practice. A hearing similar
to the one suggested in the text may be held at the beginning of any motion hearing
in which both defendant and counsel participate. In addition, if motions are never
made because the defendant refused to permit counsel to proceed, that decision should
be placed on the record at the beginning of trial. These problems are not insignificant.
Many defendants complain on appeal about the failure of counsel to make certain mo-
tions. They should be permitted both to require that certain motions be made and
to forbid the making of others. The screening of "frivolous" motions is better performed
by the courts than by counsel. If counsel refuses to proceed with a motion, the defend-
ant should not be prohibited from filing a paper merely because he is represented by
counsel.
Early hearings may also be required when evidence comes to light that the defend-
ant is incompetent to make a sixth amendment waiver or to participate meaningfully
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court need not be aware of the exact nature of the mixed representa-
tion decision until trial is imminent. Defendant and counsel should be
asked, before trial, to state on the record their understanding of the
division of trial responsibilities. Although counsel has a continuing ob-
ligation to inform the court of disputes affecting case preparation, the
vast majority of mixed representation cases could progress to trial with-
out judicial intervention. Similar efficiency arguments would restrict
the defendant's capacity to make significant midtrial alterations of the
waivers. To avoid inappropriate interruptions of trial, the trial court
should be vested with discretion to prohibit alterations that exceed
minor strategic changes.
Obviously, every trial event cannot be anticipated; nor can every
question or objection be drafted before trial. Both the general unpre-
dictability of the course of a trial and the criminal discovery rules neces-
sarily limit the specificity of a pretrial mixed representation waiver
hearing. Thus the particular witnesses to be called or to be cross-
examined and the particular exhibits to be used, for example, could
not be specified at the hearing. The most that the pretrial waiver hear-
ing can accomplish is delineation of general functions between coun-
sel and defendant. It would, however, be quite possible to allocate
who makes the decisions to call or cross-examine witnesses and to intro-
duce certain exhibits.
The small residue of cases in which a surprise is not resolvable
by reference to the general waivers may be simply handled. If the
surprise is a result of significant governmental misbehavior, a continu-
ance should normally result. In such cases the defense team should
be permitted to regroup; contract status should not attach in such circum-
stances to the waivers. Finally, where the trial decision must be made
instantaneously, the resolution should depend on a "residuary clause"
in the general waivers. That is, all areas not dealt with in the general
waivers should be allocated at the pre-trial hearing to either the defend-
ant or counsel.1 88
E. Collateral Attack and Faretta
Faretta, like Henry v. Mississippi, 89 is a federal review of a final
state court judgment. As previously mentioned, the courts have incor-
in his trial. The competency questions, however, may certainly be resolved well before
trial, as is typically done now, leaving the mixed representation decisions until later.
188. Imagine the "horror story" of the defendant who in the middle of trial gives
counsel a note demanding that counsel ask the chief government witness why he was
"sure the defendant was the person who kicked the victim after he was already uncon-
scious?" Assuming that cross-examination of government witnesses has been left with
counsel, the note may be ignored. Obviously, all attorney-client disagreements may
not be eliminated.
189. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
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rectly looked to the deliberate bypass cases as a basis for deciding tacti-
cal control issues; collateral attack and proper allocation of authority
over the defense at trial are distinctly separate inquiries. The issue
now is whether the deliberate bypass doctrines are correct in light of
Faretta.
Before Faretta the right to proceed pro se did not enjoy a clear
constitutional base.190 Deliberate bypass doctrines had to be created
to deal with the question of when collateral attack had been waived
by prior actions of the defense. Consequently, courts perceived most
decisions made by either counsel or defendant as subjects for bypass
analysis and accordingly restricted the availability of collateral review
if any member of the defense team made a bypass that had a sound
tactical basis. The issue was not just whether a waiver had occurred,
but whether it was appropriate for federal courts to take another look
at a case already litigated in state court.
Now that the pro se right has been clearly embedded in the
Federal Constitution, it is appropriate to ask if Faretta dictates any
changes in the deliberate bypass rules. That is, may a deliberate
bypass occur as a result of a decision made by a lawyer or a defendant
who, under Faretta, did not have the right to make the decision?
Though the apparent answer is no, the result is not obvious. The basic
notion that stability of final state judgments is of some importance
forces us to take another short trek into the deliberate bypass cases.
The old notion-embodied in Fay v. Noia"'9 and Henry v.
Mississippi'92-that mere tactical decisions do not raise waiver issues
of a constitutional dimension is false. Faretta transforms the issue into
whether the decisional apparatus at trial should be treated differently
in federal reviews of state convictions than in direct appeals. The
Court in Stone v. Powell'9 3 manifests the possibility that such a differ-
ence could arise. In Stone the Court refused to review the merits of
a search claim previously litigated in state court because the additional
deterrent value, if any, to be gained by extending the exclusionary rules
beyond trial and appeal were outweighed by the cost to the truth-
finding endeavors of the adversary system. 19 4 Although such balancing
of interests may be appropriate for fourth amendment purposes, there
is no similar balance at work in Faretta. Even if the state court ex-
tends a "benefit" to a defendant by denying his motion for total or par-
190. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,
1123 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
191. 3,72 U.S. 391 (1963).
192. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
193. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (.1976).
194. Id. at 3049-52.
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tial pro se representation, Faretta requires a reversal because the harm-
less error rules are not applicable. In such circumstances the federal
courts must be open for vindication of a federal claim that counsel over-
reached his right to control a defendant's trial."9
In the last analysis Faretta may significantly aid decisionmaking
in habeas cases. Assuming that state courts are obligated to provide
defendants with the option of proceeding pro se or in mixed fashion,
the pretrial waiver hearing should provide an on-the-record decision by
each defendant regarding the scope of control he desires to exercise
over his own defense. A record of the sixth amendment waiver
dialogue would significantly ease the judicial task of deciding if one
party or the other had the authority to bypass a crucial federal right
in a state court proceeding.
CONCLUSION
Faretta's impact is much more dramatic than the courts have yet
recognized. It provides a constitutional basis for overruling the illogical
and inconsistent doctrine that counsel must control trial tactics. This
change presents serious practical difficulties. The problems can be
largely overcome, however, by requiring pretrial waiver hearings at
which a defendant specifies the extent to which he desires counsel
and by redefining counsel's role in the attorney-client relationship. That
a defendant proceeds without counsel should not deprive him of his
right to due process; rather, the courts must intervene to ensure it.
With Faretta history has come full circle. Prior to Powell v.
Alabama9" the use of counsel in criminal trials at the state and federal
levels was appallingly low.19' The slow development of the constitu-
tional right to counsel in criminal cases changed this picture dramati-
cally.198 The passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964111 and the
implementation under the Act of the various district plans for provision
195. This proposition assumes that the issue was raised below and that no adequate
state procedural ground exists for denying a defendant access to federal court. See
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (failure to make objection to composition
of grand jury within period provided by state law constitutes waiver). It also assumes
that a search question is not involved. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). If
counsel ineffectively advised a defendant on a search question, or ineffectively proceeded
through a motion process, however, Stone would not prevent collateral review.
196. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
197. For a review of the historical development of the right to counsel from the
prerevolutionary era through 1955, see BEANEY, supra note 71. Data compiled as re-
cently as 1962 still indicated that significant numbers of defendants were not assigned
counsel. SrLVmismNr, supra note 3, at 89-104.
198. This constitutional development was certainly not preordained. The sixth
amendment was probably drafted to protect only the right to retain counsel of choice.
See BEANEY, supra note 71, at 14-26.
199. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1976).
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of paid counsel in the federal courts200 have insured that counsel will
routinely be provided in most federal criminal cases. 201 In recent years
judicial pronouncements on the right to counsel have often spoken of
the careful inquiries necessary to insure the propriety of waivers of coun-
sel. 202 Although the development of the right to counsel has certainly
been beneficial, difficulties with the developing rigidities of the right com-
mand attention. Even if the novelty of widespread access to assigned
counsel justified certain rigidities, we have long since weathered the
initial experimental storms. 3
It has been written that
the more a man looks at a thing, the less he can see it, and the more
a man learns a thing, the less he knows it. The Fabian argument
of the expert, that the man who is trained should be the man who is
trusted, would be absolutely unanswerable if it were really true that
a man who studied a thing and practiced it every day went on seeing
more and more of its significance. But he does not.
20 4
Faretta may help the legal profession learn that an expert attorney is
of limited use to some and of no use to others.
200. Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, each district was obligated to promul-
gate a plan for the implementation of the Act Id. § 3006A(a). For a survey of
the plans see THE CRIMINAL JUsTIcE AcT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, supra
note 3.
201. In 1966 only 17 percent of federal criminal cases proceeded without counsel.
Many of these were dismissal or nolle prosequi cases, or were immigration cases in
the south or southwest. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AcT IN THE FEDER.AL Dlsrucr CoURTS,
supra note 3, at 82-87.
202. See Ford v. Wainwright, 526 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
ex rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Du-
janovic, 486 F.2d 182, 185-8.6 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d
271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964). In Plattner the Second Circuit recommended advising defend-
ants of the right to proceed pro se. Nonetheless, the court also expressed its great
concern that the pro se decision be made only after judicial advice to the defendant
to accept counsel. Id.
203. In an area as complex as the criminal justice system, speedy alteration of
historical patterns is likely to cause some disruption. Perhaps the single area where
the disruption has been most pronounced is the juvenile courts. See generally W.
STAPLETON & L. TEIrELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YotrrH (1972). The role of counsel
in delinquency proceedings still is unsettled. See Kay & Segal, The Role of the Attorney
in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A No -Polar Approach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401 (1973);
Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The Juvelile Justice System: In Search of the Role of
Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 375 (19 1). The introduction of pro se representation
and waiver of counsel problems into the juvenile courts presents great difficulties. The
propositions that counsel may never be waived by a juvenile and that counsel may make
decisions for their young clients have more power in this context than in adult courts.
See In re Appeal No. 544, 25 Md. App. 26, 332 A.2d 680 (1975); Kay & Segal, supra
at 1410-11. But see Comment, The Minor's Right to Medical Treatment: A Corollary
of the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1975). Although
this Article does not focus on juvenile problems, the discussion of pro se trials with
inarticulate defendants is relevant to delinquency proceedings. See Section IV(C) supra.
204. G. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 57 (1955).
